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Since independence, relations between Pakistan and India have been fraught with 
contentious issues. Most of these conflicts were related to the demarcation of borders and 
the non-resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The primary focus of efforts and ideas to 
resolve these conflicts has been land-based—for example, the future of Kashmir, the 
delimitation of the Line of Control (LOC), and the Siachen Glacier issue. Less focus has 
been given to the maritime issues between both countries, including Sir Creek and its 
effect on the delimitation of the interstate maritime boundary; the arrest and repatriation 
of fishermen by both sides; and non-cooperation between maritime forces at sea. The 
resolution of maritime issues between Pakistan and India is essential because it is a 
potential area of significant cooperation between the two rivals. As this thesis 
demonstrates through its analysis of these issues and comparable international disputes, 
small, preliminary steps by both sides toward the resolution of these maritime issues will 
build and strengthen the cooperation, which could pave the way for the resolution of 
more complex and substantive disputes in the future. In other words, peace in Kashmir 
may be wrought at sea. 
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Every kind of peaceful cooperation among men is primarily based on 
mutual trust and only secondarily on institutions such as courts of justice 
and police . . . Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved 
through understanding . . . There’s been a quantum leap technologically 
in our age, but unless there’s another quantum leap in human relations, 






Since their independence, relations between Pakistan and India have been fraught 
with contentious issues. Most of these conflicts were related to the demarcation of 
borders and the non-resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The primary focus of plans and 
efforts to resolve these conflicts has been land-based; for example, the future of Kashmir, 
the delimitation of the Line of Control (LOC), and the Siachen Glacier issue. Less focus 
has been given to the maritime issues2 between both countries, including Sir Creek and 
its effect on the interstate maritime boundary delimitation; the arrest and repatriation of 
fishermen by both sides; and non-cooperation between maritime forces at sea. The 
resolution of maritime issues between Pakistan and India is essential because on the one 
hand, it is a potential area of significant cooperation between the two rivals, and on the 
other hand, the failure to resolve these issues can further complicate relations between 
these two countries. Small, preliminary steps by both sides toward the resolution of these 
maritime issues will build and strengthen the cooperation, which could pave the way for 
the resolution of more complex and substantive disputes in the future.3 In other words, 
peace in Kashmir may be wrought at sea. 
                                                 
1 “The Emily Fund For a Better World,” Do One Thing Quotes For a Better World, Accessed July 12, 
2012. http://www.doonething.org/quotes/conflict-quotes.htm  
2 Hasan Ansari & Ravi Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center, 
Confidence Building Measures at Sea: Opportunities for India and Pakistan,” Occasional Paper no. 33, 




A. THREE MARITIME DISPUTES 
It is pertinent to explain concisely what each of maritime disputes between 
Pakistan and India involves. First, Sir Creek is one of the enduring disputes between 
Pakistan and India. It involves conflicting claims to a 60-mile long water strip in the 
Rann of Kutch, separating the Sindh province of the southern part of Pakistan from the 
Indian province of Gujarat. This disagreement has sought a solution in bilateral, 
transnational, or international law for at least a century now. Under the contemporary 
treaty scheme, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), the dispute has acquired a particular urgency. Because the Sir Creek dispute 
is not as politically charged as some of the other long-standing points of disagreement 
between Pakistan and India, however, the resolution of this issue might serve as a catalyst 
for a broader reconciliation between the great South Asian powers.  
Second, as fish rarely regard national boundaries, Pakistani and Indian fishermen 
adopt the traditional way of fishing—they follow the fish. Both sides’ fishermen 
encroach on each other’s territory in search of a good quality of fish, and, as a 
consequence, both sides’ security forces arrest these fishermen and confiscate their boats. 
In almost all cases, it takes years to release these fishermen from the jails because of the 
painfully slow process of Pakistan’s and India’s judicial systems.4 These men remain in 
the jails without any contact with their families. These incarcerations represent one more 
negative aspect in the minds of the public on both sides; collectively, they tax bilateral 
relations as well. On some occasions, these fishermen are used for political purposes, 
when both sides’ governments release them as goodwill gestures without any legal 
process.5 Such gestures may resolve a particular case, but the larger issue remains a sore 
area between Pakistan and India. 
Finally, as in the land-based skirmishes, some of the naval forces’ actions also 
contribute to political tension between Pakistan and India. In August 1999, Indian 
security forces shot down one Pakistani unarmed surveillance and anti-submarine warfare 
                                                 




(ASW) aircraft.6 Pakistani authorities declared that the aircraft was on training mission; 
in contrast, the Indian authorities insisted that the aircraft was on a spy mission. 
According to Sikandar Ahmed Shah, “Pakistan lodged a complaint with the [International 
Court of Justice],7 which was subsequently dismissed by the court. The Court agreed with 
India’s position that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the case, because India had filed an 
exemption in 1974, concerning disputes between India and other countries that are or 
have been members of the Commonwealth of Nations.”8 The Court’s decision did 
nothing to resolve the issue, of course. Another incident occurred in July 2011, when the 
Indian Navy ship (INS) Godavari brushed the Pakistan Navy ship (PNS) Babur out at sea. 
PNS Babur was on a humanitarian mission, escorting Merchant Vessel (MV) Suez, which 
had just been released by Somalia’s pirates. Pakistan lodged a protest over the incident 
through the Indian High Commission, noting that the Indian ship had not only hampered 
the humanitarian mission but also attempted dangerous maneuvers that resulted in 
damage to the sides of both warships.9 Pakistan considered this incident a violation of the 
1991 Pakistan-India Agreement on advanced notice of military exercise maneuvers and 
international regulations related to safe conduct at high seas.10 Such naval encounters 
could be avoided through good bilateral relations and cooperation between two navies.  
This thesis argues that resolving one or even two of these issues in isolation will 
not bring about lasting improvements in Pakistan-Indian relations. For example, if the Sir 
                                                 
6 Sikander Ahmed Shah, “River Boundary Delimitation and the Resolution of the Sir Creek Dispute 
Between Pakistan and India,” 395–396, Accessed July 12, 2012, 
http://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/files/2012/02/shah.pdf. He further explained that, in May, 1999, Pakistan 
shot down two Indian Air force (IAF) aircrafts along the Line of Control (LoC) in response to an airspace 
violation, therefore shooting down the Pakistani ASW aircraft by Indian Forces has also been viewed an act 
of revenge.  
7 The Court stated that as the Commonwealth reservation raised by India was valid under Article 36, 
Paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute, it was “unnecessary for [it] to consider India’s objection based on the 
reservation concerning multilateral treaties. See Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Oneindia News. “Save Sailors mission: India and Pakistan Start War Again,” (Saturday, June 18, 
2011 IST), Accessed May 13, 2012, http://news.oneindia.in/2011/06/18/india-pakistan-war-help-mv-suez-
sailors-godavari-babur-aid0101.html.  
10 The Times of India. “Naval Maneuver Sparks Indo-Pak war of words” (Jun 19, 2011, 2.48am IST), 
Accessed May 13, 2012, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011–06–9/india/29676640_1_somali-
pirates-naval-ship-PNS-Babur. The Economic Times. “India, Pakistan in war of words as warships collide” 




Creek and fishermen issues are resolved, but both states still encounter each other’s ships 
or maritime aircraft in less than friendly ways, then no real trust will develop, which will 
affect the confidence measures in turn. It is therefore necessary that positive steps be 
initiated to resolve all maritime issues in parallel or thoughtful succession. Neither 
Pakistan nor India can afford any maritime conflict without risking significant damage to 
both states’ economies. In addition, war at sea is not restricted to any geographical 
boundaries and always poses global concerns because of other states’ maritime interests. 
Around 70 percent of oil is transported from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asian states 
Japan, Taiwan, and Korea through Arabian Sea.11 Therefore, the importance of resolution 
of maritime issues between Pakistan and India resonates with both states and much of the 
world besides.  
In sum, this thesis argues that resolution of maritime issues can affect the trust 
deficit and increase cooperation between Pakistan and India, which may lead both states 
to resolve more complex issues, including Kashmir, the LOC, and the Siachen Glacier in 
the future. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Following World War II, Britain found itself with neither the will nor the 
resources to continue its involvement in South Asia. Amid rising tensions between the 
Muslim and Hindu subjects of British India, London decided to pull out from the sub-
continent a year earlier than scheduled. This abrupt withdrawal, punctuated by the 
partition of India in August 1947, heralded a traumatic time as the new state of Pakistan 
and freshly independent India had to sort out borders and accommodate upwards of five 
million displaced persons on either side of the new frontier. In addition, the partition left 
unresolved several significant issues between Pakistan and India, including the status of 
Kashmir and the Siachen Glacier region, among other border disputes, which afterward 
caused major interstate conflicts and taxed the bilateral relations between both countries. 
                                                 
11 Peter Walker, “The Evolving Regional Security Environment: What the Maritime Strategist Should 
Know,” Presented to the Regional Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean conference, (Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, July 2001), 88–100. 
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More than once, these frictions erupted in war—in 1948 (the first Kashmir war), 
1965 (the second Kashmir war), and 1971—between both countries that increased 
militarism on each side12—and which has now escalated to a nuclear contest. The 
persistence of this unrest, particularly with both states in possession of strategic and 
tactical nuclear weapons, has made South Asia one of the most volatile regions in the 
world.  
In Pakistan, the armed forces predominate over the domestic political structure, 
and the military leadership, led by the ground forces, concentrates on such continental 
disputes as Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the LOC issues. India also remains land-
oriented despite its vast ocean coastline.13 Indeed, Pakistan and India more or less have 
ignored their maritime disputes even though some 95 percent of their respective trade is 
carried by sea.14 The contentious land issues similarly eclipse the potential for better 
maritime cooperation, both as a means to ending particular disputes and as a basis for 
improved relations, in general, between Pakistan and India. The straightforward nature of 
the maritime disputes between Pakistan and India, as well as the similarities in the culture 
of both states’ naval forces and the less conflicted maritime history between both 
countries present a very real opportunity in this regard. As Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa Agha 
states, “the Indian and Pakistani navies do not carry as much psychological baggage as 
other branches of the services do.”15 In the same context, Commander Rajesh Pendharker 
of the Indian Navy has suggested that “the character of the Naval forces themselves 
makes it possible to cooperate in a manner detached from political wrangling between the 
two states.”16  
                                                 
12 Ahmed Faruqui. Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia. 
(Aldershot: Ashgate publishing limited, 2003). xxix-190. 
13 Hasan Ansari & Ravi Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center, 
Confidence Building Measures at Sea,” 5 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, “Sandia National Laboratories, Maritime Cooperation between India and 
Pakistan: Building Confidence at Sea, Cooperative Monitoring Center,” Occasional paper no. 8, (Nov, 
2000), 11. 
16 Rajesh Pendharkar, The Lahore Declaration and Beyond: Maritime Confidence-Building Measures 
in 
South Asia, Occasional Paper 51. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Centre. February 2003. iii. 
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To be sure, incidents have occurred between both navies, where they have 
shadowed each other’s ships and even shot down aircraft. Vijai Sakhuja counts four such 
incidents,17 whereas Cdr. Pendharker has noted three: one each in the years 1995, 1996, 
and 1999.18 These close encounters could have ignited conflicts but, fortunately, both 
sides took a very moderate stance each time. At the same time, a number of Chiefs of 
Naval Staff have shown keen interest commencing navy-to-navy cooperation and have 
urged their respective governments to allow the mutual visit of ships and officers at the 
senior level in order to develop friendly relations and create a more harmonious 
environment at sea.19  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The body of published materials relevant to this thesis includes numerous studies, 
reports, and literature in the form of government reports, journal articles, and scholarly 
books. Most of the South Asian scholars of the topic have given most of their attention to 
such maritime issues as the Sir Creek dispute; the delimitation of the sea boundary; and, 
at least by implication, to the problems of the fishermen. Somewhat less material is 
available on naval encounters between both states. It is a common consensus across the 
governments of the world that good international relations and effective sea management 
require clear demarcation of maritime boundaries. The Sir Creek issue, among others, 
involves exactly this issue and keeps both countries from agreeing on the demarcation of 
their mutual maritime boundary.  
Maritime boundary making is a major task for coastal states, especially if there is 
oil or gas on the seabed or on the subsoil, which make the acre of sea worth more than an 
acre of barren land.20 Throughout the world, according to Anderson, “Currently 180 
boundaries have been agreed upon, which is far less than the 400 boundaries that 
potentially exists . . . The reasons are that countries tend not to see boundary-making as a 
                                                 
17 Vijai Sakuja, “Cold War in the Arabian Sea,” Strategic Analysis, XXV, 4 (June 2001). 376–377. 
18 Rajesh Pendharkar, The Lahore Declaration and Beyond,” 5. 
19 Hasan Ansari & Ravi Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center, 
Confidence Building Measures at Sea,” 7. 
20 David Anderson. CMG, “Chatham House: Independent Thinking on International Affairs,” 
Methods of resolving maritime boundary disputes, (February 14, 2006), 1–6. 
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priority, in the absence of any incidents or natural resources . . . Furthermore, developing 
countries often do not have ready access to the required technical advice from 
hydrography . . . Some of them have nevertheless negotiated boundaries e.g., because of 
encouragement by the oil industry.”21 However, J.G. Merrills’s book International 
Dispute Settlement examines different ways of international dispute settlement such as 
negotiation, mediation, inquiry, and reconciliation through diplomatic means; arbitration 
and judicial settlement through legal means; and dispute settlement concerning trade and 
the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a special 
arrangement.22 He discusses the Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Case 
between Qatar and Bahrain, which had brought the two states close to war in 1986. The 
dispute was subsequently settled by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).23 After 
settlement of the dispute, both states ended up with good bilateral relations and now they 
are working on a massive construction project: a 24.85-mile-long “friendship-bridge” 
between Qatar and Bahrain. When the structure is complete, it will be the longest bridge 
in the world.24  
Another international maritime boundary dispute, this one between Suriname and 
Guyana, is very similar to the Pakistan-Indian maritime dispute. Suriname and Guyana 
have adjacent coastlines, and Corentyne is a boundary river separating both states.25 The 
Corentyne was a source of dispute in terms of river and maritime boundaries. On 
September 17, 2007, under Annex VII26 of the 1982 United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a five-member arbitration tribunal was constituted to resolve 
the dispute. The tribunal supported Suriname’s claim and argued that as the land 
boundary terminus was located on the western side (towards Guyana) of the river, 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 J. G. Merrills, international dispute settlement, (cambridge university press, new york, 2005), 1–
390. 
23 Ibid., 17. 
24 Qatar Visitor, “The Qatar Bahrain Friendship Bridge: The Longest Bridge in the World,” Accessed 
June 6, 2012, http://www.qatarvisitor.com/index.php?cID=413&pID=1260.  
25 Arbitration (Guyana. V. Suriname), Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, In the Matter of an Arbitration 
between: Guyana- and -Suriname,” (The Hague, 17 September 2007), 27. 
26 UNCLOS Annex VII is regarding Arbitration comprising Article 1 – Article 13. 
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Suriname had a right over the entire river, and the thalweg27 principle was not applicable. 
After settlement of the dispute, both states developed good bilateral relations. During a 
meeting in February 2012, both countries’ presidents discussed strengthening bilateral 
cooperation in terms of joint anti-piracy operations, intelligence sharing, and cross-border 
security. Interestingly, they also discussed building a bridge across the Corentyne River, 
which would enhance trade and economic relations between both countries.28 
These empirical cases show the importance of the resolution of maritime disputes 
for the enhancement of bilateral cooperation. In this thesis, such cases have been used as 
examples to seek the settlement of Pakistan and India maritime disputes. 
The existing literature focuses largely on the process of past confidence-building 
measures (CBMs), which are mostly related to land-based issues. Even where maritime 
issues have been discussed, the analysis is neither wide nor deep enough. Other scholars, 
including Jayanta Kumar Ray, Dennis Rumley, and Afsir Karim, have also generally 
discussed the maritime issues, particularly Sir Creek, but they have given more 
consideration to the land-based issues.29 Still, there emerges in the literature a general 
agreement on the importance of resolution of the maritime issues, and increasing 
cooperation through resolution of maritime issues is a viable option, but there is less 
agreement on the approach to the recognition and resolution of the issues. They have not 
recognized the importance of naval encounters, how it affect the bilateral relations and 
changes the political environment like shooting down Pakistani and Indian aircrafts or 
brushing each other’s ships at sea.  
                                                 
27 “Under international law, the thalweg is used to demarcate navigable rivers that are also Boundary 
Rivers. Thalweg has also been defined as the down way; that is, the course taken by boats going 
downstream, which again is that of the strongest current; the middle, or deepest, or most navigable channel; 
the line of the greatest depth; or the stream line of the fastest current; and the axis of the safest and most 
accessible channel for the largest ships. See Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 367–368.  
28 Kaieteur News, Enhanced Guyana/Suriname relations fuelled by common goals – Luncheon, 
(February 25, 2012), Accessed May 15, 2012, http://www.kaieteurnewsonline.com/2012/02/25/enhanced-
guyanasuriname-relations-fuelled-by-common-goals-luncheon. 
29 Ray Jayanta Kumar, Aspects of India’s International Relations, 177–2000 South Asia and the 
World, Volume X part 6, PHISPC, Center for the studies in civilizations, 2007, 241–42; Dennis Rumley., 
Chaturvedi Sanjay., and Sakhuja Vijay. Fisheries Exploitation in the Indian OceanThreatsand 
Opportunities, ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, 170–74; Afsir. Karim, Indo-
Pakistan Relations: Viewpoints 1989–1996, (IDR, Lancer publishers and Distributors, 1996), 215–21. 
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The disagreement in the literature centers on how to convince Pakistan and India 
to develop trust in one other and increase cooperation. For this purpose scholars have 
presented different prescriptions, but they highlight the maritime issues in isolation. They 
argue that navy-to-navy interaction and resolution of the Sir Creek dispute will suffice for 
the requirement of building confidence between Pakistan and India. Rajesh and Agha 
have affiliations with the Indian and Pakistani navies; therefore, they believe that visiting 
of ships to each other’s countries, visiting of senior naval officers to each other’s navy 
setup, conducting joint maritime exercises, and maintaining good navy-to-navy 
communication will work to increase cooperation.30 Shah and Khan emphasize the Sir 
Creek dispute and believe that resolution of this dispute can cause good cooperation.31 
They also think that the military forces, especially the navies, of both states rely on each 
other as experts in the same fields; these authors pinpoint the trust deficit at the political 
level.32 At one level, they may have a point, but navy-to-navy interaction is not possible 
without political agreement or good bilateral relations because a military institution 
cannot act independently. Moreover, resolving one issue in isolation like the Sir Creek 
issue will not build sufficient confidence until other maritime issues are resolved.  
In this connection, the other scholars such as Ravi Vohra and Hasan Ansari (both 
are retired admirals; the former from the Indian Navy and the latter from the Pakistan 
Navy) give deep insight into the maritime issues and take a bit broader approach than the 
previous one. They believe that the sea provides good opportunities to both states in 
developing confidence. Their view posits more of a trickle-down effect of mistrust—the 
trust deficit at the political level necessarily colors relations between the military forces 
as well. They have highlighted the main issues like the Sir Creek dispute, the delimitation 
of the maritime boundary, the fishermen issue, shipping and cargo security, and the 
                                                 
30 Rajesh Pendharkar, The Lahore Declaration and Beyond: Maritime Confidence-Building Measures 
inSouth Asia, (February 20, 2003), Accessed May 12, 2012, http://www.stimson.org/summaries/the-lahore-
declaration-and-beyond-maritime-confidence-building-measures-in-south-asia/; Ayesha, “Building 
Confidence at Sea,” 9–39. 
31 Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 357–414; Rashid Ahmad Khan, “Sir Creek: The Origin 




interaction of maritime agencies.33 They argue that Sir Creek and the maritime boundary 
are different issues,34 whereas this paper argues that if the Sir Creek dispute is resolved 
then the maritime boundary will be automatically demarcated; it is the Sir Creek issue 
that has complicated the demarcation of maritime boundary between Pakistan and India. 
Moreover, shipping and cargo security is not possible in the presence of the significant 
trust deficit between both states. This paper argues, in contrast, that resolution of all 
maritime issues including Sir Creek, fishermen, and operational encounters at sea is 
important and will increase trust and cooperation. Then both countries can undertake 
other maritime affairs.  
However, as far as the confidence-building measures are concerned, this thesis 
will cover all maritime issues between Pakistan and India following the second school’s 
idea of confidence-building measures in order to increase trust and cooperation between 
both states. What is missing from the literature is a deep and consolidated insight into the 
maritime issues between Pakistan and India that include: (1) recognition of the important 
maritime issues and possible solutions for these issues in light of international law, 
specifically case studies of international maritime disputes that have been successfully 
resolved; and (2) analysis of these issues in terms of confidence-building measures 
(CBMs), whereby resolution of these issues will help overcome the trust deficit between 
the two countries and quite possibly lead to the resolution of more complex issues like 
Kashmir, the LOC, and the Siachen Glacier. This thesis takes up exactly these questions 
in light of the existing literature. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis systematically analyzes and evaluates the maritime issues between 
Pakistan and India, starting with Sir Creek (the longest-standing maritime dispute) then 
proceeding through the fishermen issues, and culminates in the simmering operational 
encounters. By addressing these concerns, both states will benefit, while each and every 
success can also play a role in building cooperation between both states. The analysis will 
                                                 
33 Hasan Ansari and Ravi Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center, 
Confidence Building Measures at Sea,” 1–49. 
34 Ibid., 10–19.  
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account for both Pakistan’s and India’s perspectives on each issue. Each issue will be 
examined discretely for context and specifics before the analysis turn to combined 
conclusions. Ultimately, this thesis highlights the importance of resolving each issue on 
its own merits and all of them because of their combined gravity in the present and future 
of relations between both states. 
Because these conflicts are current and ongoing, the best information largely 
comes from books, journal articles from historical and social studies sources, professional 
and scholarly journals like Kutch-Sindh Dispute by Mukund35 and India and Pakistan: 
Ten Questions on the Peace Process,36 and all other resources which have already been 
mentioned. Occasional papers from Sandia National Laboratory and other sources related 
to maritime issues and confidence-building measures will also be used, as mentioned in 
the previous section. Moreover, major Pakistani and Indian newspapers like Dawn, The 
News, The Times of India, and Hindustan Times will also be consulted, particularly for 
accounts of events and incidents that have not received much scholarly attention. 
Contemporary print and electronic media will be utilized for collection of current 
information, official statements, and recent analysis.   
It is worth mentioning that both Pakistan and India are signatories to the United 
Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea37 but because of the Sir Creek dispute, 
they are unable to resolve their maritime boundary dispute under UNCLOS. Both 
countries have obligations under Article 76 (to decide the continental shelf),38 under 
                                                 
35 Mukund G. Untawale, “The Kutch-Sindh Dispute: A Case Study in International Arbitrition,” The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 23, no. 4 (October, 1974), 818–839.  
36 C. Raja Mohan, “Ten Question on Peace Process” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 39, no. 28 
(July 10–16, 2004): 3097–3102. 
37 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art, 15,( Dec10, 1982), 1833, U.N.T.S. 397, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. [hereafter 1982 UNCLOS].  
38 Delimitation of the continental shelf: “The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed 
and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation 
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.” See Ibid. 
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Article 74 (to decide the Exclusive Economic Zone),39 and under Article 15 (to decide 
the territorial sea).40 International law clauses under which the thalweg principle and 
Median Line rules (navigable and non-navigable waters) are used for demarcation will 
also be consulted to test the possible solution of Sir Creek and the maritime boundary 
between Pakistan and India. To understand and evaluate the maritime incidents between 
Pakistan and India, some ICJ Articles will also be consulted like Article 36 which 
favored India in the case of shooting down the Pakistani ASW aircraft.   
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II illustrates the key maritime issues between Pakistan and India, their 
significance, and possible solutions in light of international law and case studies of 
international maritime disputes that have been successfully resolved. Chapter III analyzes 
how a peaceful resolution of these maritime issues will build confidence and affect the 
trust deficit between the two countries, and how such CBMs—relatively modest matters 
that nonetheless have significant impact—will work to resolve the other entrenched 
issues like Kashmir, the LOC, and the Siachen Glacier. The final chapter concludes and 
summarizes the findings and attempts to provide an analysis of the issues as a broader, 
collective concern.  
In the end, the analysis makes clear that both the short-term and the long-term 
effects of the resolution of the maritime issues are positive and can favor both countries. 
Particularly in the presence of nuclear weapons, stability in the region and good relations 
between Pakistan and India are extremely important. 
                                                 
39 Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts: “The 
delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be 
effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” See Ibid. 
40 Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts: “Where the coasts 
of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement 
between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of 
the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason 
of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which 
is at variance therewith.” See Ibid. 
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II. MARITIME BOUNDARY ISSUE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND 
INDIA: THE CASE OF SIR CREEK 
Since inception, Pakistan and India has numerous border disputes. One of them is 
the maritime border dispute along Sir Creek. Perhaps the fundamental issue is presented 
by Sir Creek, whose dispute prevents both countries from agreeing on the demarcation of 
their mutual maritime border. Sir Creek forms one of the enduring disputes between India 
and Pakistan. It involves conflicting claims to a water strip some 60 miles in the Rann of 
Kutch, separating the Sindh province of the southern part of Pakistan from the Indian 
province of Gujarat. Because the Sir Creek dispute is not as politically charged as some 
of the other long-standing points of disagreement between Pakistan and India, however, 
the resolution of this issue might serve as a catalyst for a broader reconciliation between 
the great South Asian powers.   
There is a lot at stake in Sir Creek. According to Ansari and Vohra, “As compared 
to the highly volatile issue of Kashmir, the delimitation of the maritime boundary and the 
dispute involving the Sir Creek have not yet attained a flash point status, although both 
issues have the potential to do so at a future date.” 41 Conversely, resolution of the Sir 
Creek issue may, then, facilitate a resolution of the larger maritime boundary dispute—
and perhaps foreshadows a significant easing of tensions between South Asia’s two major 
powers. This disagreement has sought a solution in bilateral, transnational, or 
international law for at least a century now. Under the contemporary treaty scheme, 
including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the dispute 
has acquired a particular urgency. This chapter takes up the complex issues of the Sir 
Creek dispute in light of international law and case studies to present recommendations 
and viable options for both states’ governments toward a possible solution that could 
bring peace and harmony to the region.  
A. BACKGROUND 
According to Khan, “the Sir Creek dispute is the product of conflicting 
interpretations by Pakistan and India of the boundary line between Kutch and Sindh . . . 
                                                 
41 Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 8. 
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When the dispute surfaced, Sindh was part of Bombay presidency of undivided India. 
After 1947, Sindh became part of Pakistan, while Kutch remained part of India.”42 But the 
tension at Sir Creek well predates independence and partition.  
Hindu rulers presided over the Kutch and surrounding areas before the 
establishment of British rule in India. In 1760, Muslim rulers conquered Kutch State, and 
the state remained under Muslim control until 1813. When the British took over the Indo-
Pak Subcontinent, Kutch State was put under the control of the Sindh43 government. In 
1843, Sindh was conquered by the British, and was made a part of the Hindu dominated 
Bombay Presidency after 1853.44 As it was a Muslim populated area, the decision was 
found very offensive by the Muslim. However, after a powerful unrest, Sindh became a 
separate province in 1935. In 1947, Pakistan got independence from the British rulers, 
and Sindh, being a Muslim populated area, became a province of Pakistan. The Rann of 
Kutch remained an integral part of the Sindh government throughout the time of the 
British rule in India.45 
1. Resolution 1192 of 1914 
The dispute first came to light in 1907–1908, when the Maharao (Ruler) of Kutch 
claimed that the part of Sindh lying east of the Green Line (a reference line which was 
drawn as a boundary line on the eastern bank of Sir Creek), belonged to Kutch State. (See 
Figure 1, showing Map B – 44).  
                                                 
42 Rashid Ahmad. Khan, “Sir Creek,” 2. 
43 Sindh is one of the provinces of Pakistan and is located on the western corner of South Asia. 
44 Mukund G. Untawale, “The Kutch-Sindh Dispute: A case Study in International Arbitration,” The 





Figure 1.  Map B – 44 Showing Sir Creek and Vicinity.46  
In 1907, wood-cutters from Kutch cut trees from the Sindh area, which formed 
part of British territory. The Commissioner of Sindh complained to the Bombay 
Government, which asked for an explanation from the Maharao of Kutch. In response, 
the Maharao of Kutch claimed that his state’s boundaries extend up to the eastern bank of 
Sir Creek. After considering the claims, the Government of Bombay (Sindh being its 
administrative part), sent a proposal to the Maharao of Kutch, signaling that Bombay was 
prepared to agree to the boundary along the eastern bank of Sir Creek from the mouth to 
its top (shown as the green line on Map B-44, Figure 1). At the same time, the 
representatives suggested that from the top of Sir Creek, the boundary should follow the 
east-west line (shown as the blue dotted line) until it joins the Sindh boundary (the 
vertical purple line.) The Maharao of Kutch agreed to this proposal.47 The Secretary of 
the Bombay Government sent this proposal to the foreign department of the government 
of India in Letter #5543, dated September 20, 1913. The aim was to accord sanction to 
                                                 
46 From Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 17, 2003 
47 Ibid., 399. 
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the rectification of the Kutch–Sindh boundary in accordance with the agreement reached 
with the Maharao of Kutch.48  
Paragraph nine of the letter dictates, “On a full review of the evidence, therefore, 
the government arrived at the conclusion that the boundary between Kutch and Sindh 
should be the green line in the accompanying map from the mouth of the Sir Creek to the 
top of the Sir Creek at the point where it joins the blue dotted line; from there it should 
follow the blue dotted line to the east, until it joins the Sindh boundary as marked in 
purple on the resolution map, and His Highness the Rao has now expressed his 
willingness to agree to this compromise.”49 The government of India accorded the 
approval for the rectification of the boundary as per the recommendation of the 
government of Bombay in Letter#3583-I.A.50 Subsequently, the government of Bombay 
passed Resolution 1192 on February 24, 1914, approving the settlement by reference to 
Letter #5543 along with Map B-44.  
2. Rann of Kutch Arbitration 
The critical Rann of Kutch territorial dispute surfaced shortly after Pakistan and 
India won independence from Britain in 1947. India claimed that the entire area of the 
Rann of Kutch belongs to India, while Pakistan insisted that the established boundary ran 
through the “middle of the Rann or approximately along the 24th parallel.”51 This 
contentious dialogue between both states continued for a decade and a half. In early 1965, 
India claimed that Pakistani troops were illegally patrolling along the 24th parallel line. 
Pakistani troops opened fire on some Indian posts and cleared them in April 1965.52 
                                                 
48  Secretary of the Bombay Government Letter #5543 dated September 20, 1913. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Foreign Department Government of India Letter #3583-I.A dated November 11, 1913. The letter 
was quoted in the arbitration awards: 
“I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter #5543, dated the 20th September 1913, 
regarding the proposed rectification of the boundary between Sindh and Kutch State.” 
“The Government of India observed with satisfaction that the dispute between the Sindh authorities 
and the Kutch Darbar has been settled by a compromise agreeable to both parties, and are pleased to accord 
their sanction to the rectification of the boundary line proposed in para 9 and 10 of your letter.”   
51 Carla S. Copeland, “The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial Disputes,” vol. 67 Fordham L. Rev. 
3073 (1999): 3077. 
52  Ibid. 
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These encounters increased the hostilities, and both states brought several thousand 
troops to Rann. Britain began negotiations shortly after the fighting commenced, and 
subsequently convinced both states observed a cease-fire agreement on June 30, 1965. 
The parties also agreed to have the dispute resolved by arbitration.53  
In accordance with the agreement, the India-Pakistan Western Boundary Tribunal 
was constituted. The Tribunal was chaired by Gunner Lagergren (a Swedish judge) 
appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations; Pakistan and India also 
nominated a non-national as a member of the Tribunal.54 In this context, a delegation 
visited New Delhi (India) in order to inspect maps and other related documents, and 
another delegation visited Islamabad (Pakistan) for the same purpose.55 Keeping in view 
the existing record presented by both countries and after a thorough deliberation, on 
February 19, 1968, the Tribunal awarded 90 percent of the disputed area of the Rann of 
Kutch to India and 10 percent to Pakistan.56 The Nagar Parker area, which was not 
legally claimed by Pakistan, was also awarded to Pakistan, because the Tribunal reasoned 
that the area was surrounded by Pakistani territory. Other areas awarded to Pakistan 
include Dhara Banni and Chhad Bet. In accordance with the evidence produced by India 
in the form of the British waiver of right over Rann, the Tribunal awarded the rest of the 
territory of the Rann of Kutch (90 percent) to India.57 Thus, the Rann of Kutch territorial 
dispute was resolved in a successful manner through arbitration. 
3. Sir Creek since Independence 
The Sir Creek dispute surfaced after Pakistan and India agreed before the Rann of 
Kutch Tribunal to mark the Sindh/Rann of Kutch boundary.58 However, the contest 
before the arbitration tribunal did not include the westernmost area of the Rann of Kutch, 
commencing from the Western Terminus to the head of Sir Creek further to the west (see 
                                                 
53  Ibid. 
54 Rashid Ahmad. Khan, “Sir Creek,” 5.  
55 Carla S. Copeland, “The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial Disputes,”3078. 
56  Sikander. “River Boundary Delimitation,” 357. 
57 Carla S. Copeland, “The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial Disputes,”3080. 
58 Ashutosh. Misra, “The Sir Creek Boundary Dispute: A Victim of India-Pakistan Linkage Politics,” 
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Winter (2000–2001), 91.  
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Figure 1).59 Interestingly, both states also avoided bringing up the demarcation issue 
between the top of Sir Creek to its mouth at the Arabian Sea in the southwest. This failure 
to address the entire Sir Creek boundary issue through arbitration ended up giving birth to 
the current dispute.60 Since then, both India and Pakistan initiated claims from their 
particular perspectives.  
Pakistan cites Resolution 1192 of 1914 for the proposition that the entire creek—
up to its bank on the eastern side—was part of the Sindh government before the partition 
of the Indo-Pak subcontinent. Pakistan insists that because of the resolution, neither India 
nor Pakistan contested the Sir Creek boundary before the Tribunal.61 Resolution 1192 
published vide Letter #5543 and also included map B-44 (see Figure 1), which is known 
as the 1914 Resolution map.62 A green line shown on the map, running along the eastern 
bank of Sir Creek, is considered by Pakistan as the boundary between Sindh (Pakistan) 
and Kutch (India).63 Pakistan claims that the boundary line between Sindh and Kutch 
(the green line on the eastern bank of Sir Creek) was defined on the basis of compromise 
under which the Sindh Government would give up its claim over Kori Creek so as to 
claim the entire Sir Creek.64 Therefore, Pakistan argues that under the 1192 resolution, 
delimitation of the boundary between Pakistan and India on the eastern bank of Sir Creek 
is to be permanently fixed. 
It is worth mentioning that, where paragraph nine of Letter #5543 clearly 
delimited the boundary on the eastern bank of Sir Creek, interestingly, paragraph ten of 
the same letter documents the contrary views of the Sindh’ Commissioner. He stated that, 
“as the river changes its course from time to time, ‘the center of the navigable channel of 
the Sir Creek’ should be used as the boundary.”65 However, his commanding officer, the 
Secretary of the Bombay Presidency, contradicted the Commissioner’s statement in the 
                                                 
59 Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 358. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ashutosh. Misra, “The Sir Creek Boundary Dispute,” 91–92. 
62 A. G. Noorani, “Confidence-Building Measures for the Siachen Glacier, Sir Creek and the Wullar 
Barrage Disputes, Occasional Paper 16 (Apr. 1, 1994), 27. 
63 Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 17. 
64 Noorani, “Confidence Building Measures,” 27. 
65 Secretary of the Bombay Government Letter #5543 dated 20 September, 1913, paragraph 10. 
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same letter and stated that the river was tidal and not navigable in any significant way, 
which, in turn, was one of the reasons for the boundary not being in the middle of the 
river.66 India asserts that the Commissioner’s statement in Letter #5543 supports India’s 
position, and, therefore in accordance with international law, the “thalweg principle”is 
the only option to delimit the proper boundary in Sir Creek. In hydrography the word 
‘thalweg’ is used for the valley line and for channels that are constantly used for 
navigation purposes. However, under international law, the thalweg is used for 
delimitation of navigable rivers and also for rivers’ boundaries.67 The thalweg can also 
be defined as “the down way: that is, the course taken by boats going downstream, which 
again is that of the strongest current; the middle, or deepest, or most navigable channel; 
the line of the greatest depth or the stream line of the fastest current; and the axis of the 
safest and most accessible channel for the largest ships.”68 The ‘thalweg principle’ can be 
defined as when “the border between two countries is separated by a flowing body of 
water (river) and the boundary line is determined when it reaches the greatest depth of the 
channel or watercourse.”69 This principle has been used in numerous decisions taken 
through international law for the delimitation of rivers’ boundaries. Commonly, it has 
been named as the middle of the river or middle of the channel. The word ‘middle’ has 
also been used in the median line principle. However, it differs from the thalweg 
principle in the sense that the phrase ‘middle of the channel’ or ‘middle of the river’ in 
the median line principle is used for demarcation of non-navigable water; whereas, in the 
thalweg principle, it is used when the channel or river is navigable.70 
                                                 
66 “I am to explain that the term ‘navigable’ is really inappropriate in the larger sense. The creek is, of 
course, tidal, and it is only at certain conditions of the tide that the channel is navigable and then only to 
country craft as far as the point from which the proposed boundary turns due east from the Creek.” See 
Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 400. 
67 Ibid., 368–369.  
68 Ibid. 
69 National Security Council (NSC), Prime Minister’s Department, “The Principle of Malaysia Land 
Boundary,” Accessed October 28, 2012, 
http://www.mkn.gov.my/mkn/default/article_e.php?mod=4&fokus=9. 
70 Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 368–369.  
20 
 
4. Status of Resolution 1192 after Independence 
It is pertinent to mention that Resolution 1192 was implemented in 1924 in order 
to demarcate the boundary with the erection of boundary pillars. India claims that during 
this process, Resolution Map B-44 was fully implemented when these pillars were 
erected; therefore, the subsequent maps published by India’s survey shows the thalweg as 
the boundary in Sir Creek. India considers the green line on Map B-44 to be a symbolic 
representation and claims that the boundary between Pakistan and India has been moved 
westward as a result of accretion71 due to geographical changes in Sir Creek.72 
Nevertheless, all concerned agreed upon Resolution1192 and eventually it was 
sanctioned by the Federal and Provincial Governments. Moreover, Misra highlights that 
during implementation process of Resolution 1192 in 1924, no pillars were erected. In 
addition, the government of India released the maps published by the Survey General of 
the Sir Creek area in 1937–1938 in which the eastern side of Sir Creek is shown as the 
boundary line.73 The 1924 proceedings were just the implementation of Resolution 1192 
of 1924 to demarcate the boundary. Resolution 1192 was sanctioned and promulgated 
under the proper legal chain of command by higher authorities; therefore, Resolution 
1192 of 1924 can neither be superseded by the 1924 proceedings nor by the thalweg 
principle. Furthermore, Sikander noted that  
 . . . an official Indian map of the Kutch region—printed nearly two 
decades after the independence of India, just antecedent to the Kutch 
Arbitration in the 1960s, which is entitled ‘This Document Reveal[ing] the 
Unjustifiable Claim of Pakistan to Indian Territory’— outlines the 
elimination of the Rann of Kutch area inclusive of the Sir Creek region 
under Resolution 1192 of 1914. This map reproduces the original 
Resolution Map of 1914 (B-44), incorporating all subsequent 
                                                 
71. Accretion is described as, “If left to itself, the course of a river changes very slowly due to erosion, 
water current, or other forces of nature (like rock formation on the river bed). Infrequently, the river 
changes its course drastically due to completely breaking away from its river bed . . . Accretion is defined 
as where one can see progress being made, but cannot recognize it while it is going on.” See Ibid., 371. 
72 Ibid., 360. 
73 Ahmer. Bilal Soofi, “Legal Purview: Wullar Barrage,Siachen and Sir Creek,” South Asian Journal, 




modifications through superimposition. Therefore, it indicates the 
locations of pillar installations undertaken in 1924.74  
Therefore, the green demarcated line on the eastern line of Sir Creek was inherently a 
boundary line even after Independence. 
5. Contemporary Stance of Pakistan and India 
The Sir Creek issue has become a hindrance in the demarcation of the maritime 
boundary between Pakistan and India. Pakistan insists that first a mutually agreeable land 
terminus be defined as a reference point. This land terminus will be used to draw the 
boundary line on charts up to the distance of 200 nautical miles from the shore.75 As the 
distance of 200 nautical miles is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), this distance has 
precedence.  
India asserts that the Sir Creek boundary delimitation is related to the maritime 
boundary, but both issues could also be disconnected from each other. The maritime 
boundary could be demarcated without considering the Sir Creek issue, or both issues 
could be tackled simultaneously. For example, in January 1994, India proposed a seaward 
approach in accordance with international law insisting that the Sir Creek boundary issue 
should be settled through the thalweg principle (mid-channel) (see Recommendation 3 in 
Section C.3.). Pakistan and India, however, have dissimilar stances for how Sir Creek and 
maritime boundaries are to be delineated. Pakistan insisted that the green line shown on 
Map B-44 (see Figure 1) that is on the east bank of Sir Creek should be considered the 
boundary line, and the land boundary was to run along the same line. Thus, Pakistan 
believes that when the dispute is settled and the land terminus is decided, the issue of 
delimitation of the maritime boundary can be addressed; the maritime boundary and Sir 
Creek are two different issues; therefore, disconnect them and they can be addressed 
separately.  
                                                 
74 Information Service of India, Facts about Kutch-Sindh boundary (In maps) (1965), cited by 
Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 402. 
75 Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 12. 
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B. CASE STUDIES—MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES  
Maritime boundary delimitations involve unique coastal geography; therefore, a 
resolution of maritime disputes is extremely complicated. While resolving maritime 
disputes, international courts and tribunals rely on equitable consideration. According to 
Shah,  
The reason why international courts and tribunals have relied on equitable 
consideration in resolving international maritime disputes is the fact that 
unlike the international law of transnational river boundary delimitation, 
which is derived from customary international law and state practice 
primarily developed during colonialism with the interests of a few 
colonizing nations in mind, the laws relating to maritime boundary 
delimitations rely on numerous recently promulgated multilateral 
treaties.76 
 It is pertinent to highlight that the Sir Creek issue is not a unique one that cannot be 
resolved. Utilizing “multilateral treaties,” and under certain rules and agreements, 
numerous coastal nations have bilaterally resolved a similar nature of dispute, but 
Pakistan and India are still unable to manage a resolution of the Sir Creek dispute. It is 
therefore necessary to scrutinize some case studies that could identify the probable 
resolution of the Sir Creek issue. The two case studies below are nearly identical to the 
Sir Creek dispute. One is the resolution of maritime dispute between Suriname and 
Guyana, and the other, the resolution of the river boundary dispute between Benin and 
Niger.    
1. Case Study 1: Maritime Boundary Dispute between Suriname and 
Guyana 
Suriname and Guyana are separated by the Corentyne River, which flows 
northward into the Atlantic Ocean. These states are located on the northeast coast of the 
South American Continent. They have adjacent coastlines, and Corentyne is a boundary 
river separating both states (see Figure 2).77 The Corentyne was a source of dispute in 
                                                 
76 Sikander Ahmed. Shah, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 385.  
77 Arbitration (Guyana. V. Suriname), Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, In the Matter of an Arbitration 
between: Guyana- and -Suriname,” (The Hague, 17 September 2007), 27. 
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terms of river and maritime boundaries. The resolution of this dispute has telling 
implications for the Sir Creek case. 
Previously Suriname was a Dutch colony, while Guyana was a Britain colony. 
Suriname got independence from the Netherlands in 1975, whereas Guyana got 
independence in 1966 from Britain. The maritime dispute between the two states can be 
traced back to 1936, when Holland and Britain formed a commission to delimit the 
respective maritime boundary. The joint commission determined that the entire river was 
under Dutch control and the west bank of the river was considered a boundary.78 
However, in 1962, the Dutch government proclaimed the thalweg as the boundary in the 
Corentyne River.79 When Suriname and Guyana got independence, Suriname claimed 
that the entire river was under its sovereignty, whereas Guyana insisted that the thalweg 
should form the boundary in the Corentyne before Independence. 
On  September 17, 2007, under Annex VII80 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNLOS), a five-member arbitration tribunal was 
constituted to resolve the dispute. The tribunal supported Suriname’s claim and argued 
that as the land boundary terminus was located on the western side (toward Guyana) of 
the river, Suriname had a right over the entire river, and the thalweg principle was not 
applicable.  
However, as a consequence, the tribunal had offered special circumstances under 
Article 1581 of the UNCLOS. In order to accommodate Suriname in navigational access 
to the river, the tribunal determined that the maritime boundary between both states had 
to be adjusted.82 Moreover, if Guyana and Suriname are signatories to the UNCLOS, 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 390. 
80 UNCLOS Annex VII is regarding Arbitration comprising Article 1 – Article 13. 
81 Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts: “Where the coasts 
of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement 
between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of 
the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason 
of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which 
is at variance therewith.” See Ibid. 
82 Arbitration (Guyana. V. Suriname), 97. 
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which they signed on July 31, 1996, and July 9, 1998, respectively, they are supposed to 
adhere to the articles83 concerning the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ), the Continental Shelf between states, and all other relevant provisions of the 
Convention. 
The resolution of the Guyana and Suriname dispute provides a recipe for the 
resolution of the Sir Creek issue. Like Guyana and Suriname, Pakistan and India are also 
signatories to the UNCLOS. Therefore, in light of this case study a tribunal is required to 
be constituted to ascertain the claims of Pakistan and India over Sir Creek. In the Sir 
Creek case, the position of the existing western land terminus is apparently agreeable to 
Pakistan and India; therefore, the tribunal can easily ascertain its status, as was 
undertaken in this case study. Upon determining the position of the terminus, Pakistan 
and India’s petitions can easily be defined, which will facilitate the tribunal to convince 
both the countries on the legitimacy of their respective claims. Thus, the Guyana and 
Suriname case is a useful empirical model to resolve maritime boundary disputes, 
particularly the Sir Creek dispute between Pakistan and India.84 
                                                 
83 Article 74 (1) states, “Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts: The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” 
Article 83 (1)states, “Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts: The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be 
effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.” 
84 Kaieteur News, Enhanced Guyana/Suriname relations fuelled by common goals – Luncheon, 





Figure 2.  The Maritime Boundary Between Guyana and Suriname.85 
2. Case Study 2: River Boundary Dispute between Benin and Niger 
Benin and Niger were former French West African colonies. In 1960, they got 
their independence from France. The Niger River was a source of dispute between both 
states.86 On July 12, 2005, the ICJ formed a Chamber to delineate the disputed river 
boundary. The Chamber decided to maintain the immutability of boundaries fixed by 
                                                 
85 From Arbitration (Guyana. V. Suriname), Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, In the Matter of an 
Arbitration between: Guyana- and -Suriname,” Appendix A-5, 2007. 
86 Joshua. Castellino, “Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-Determination: An Examination of 




colonial rulers, however they added that delineation was to be determined keeping in 
view the physical “possible appearance or disappearance of certain islands in the stretch 
concerns.”87 Benin claimed that the left bank of the Niger River is the boundary between 
both states, whereas Niger claimed that the center of the river (the deepest sounding of 
the navigable channel) is the actual boundary (see Figure 3).88 The chamber supported 
Niger’s claim looking into the previous records, letters exchanged between the colonial 
rulers, and conduct of the administrative authorities, which were all proof that during the 
colonial period, the rulers were effectively exercising the territorial jurisdiction as per 
Niger’s claim.89  
Moreover, to decide the legal status of the disputed islands and comply with the 
principle governing the rightful possession of property, the chamber began to ascertain 
the thalweg of the Niger River as it existed when Benin and Niger got their 
independence. However, the Chamber decided that the thalweg principle was not to be 
considered because since Independence, the river could have potentially shifted due to 
accretion. Shah stated, “The Chamber is arguably a deviation from the international law 
principle of the fluid nature of the thalweg as the river boundary, on the basis of the 
argument that a thalweg boundary in a river is only a default rule. Under this view, an 
explicit or implicit agreement between the parties can preempt this principle.”90  
Actually, the Chamber applied the thalweg principle to the river that existed at the 
time of Independence. The islands between the left bank of the river and thalweg were 
awarded to Niger, and islands between the right bank and thalweg were awarded to 
Benin. The most debatable island was awarded to Niger.91 Nonetheless, the fact that 
specifying the exact coordinates from available records and colonial rulers’ practices, the 
Chamber defined the river boundary. The Chamber wanted to support the claim that the 
Niger River boundary was fixed at the time of Independence to uphold the supremacy of 
                                                 
87 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), 
(Judgment of 12 July 2005), 90, cited by Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 387. 
88 Ibid., 121, 133. 
89 Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 387–88. 
90 Ibid., 388. 
91 ICJ, Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Benin v. Niger), 140. 
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the principle governing the rightful possession of property.92 In sum, there were a total of 
twenty-five disputed islands in the Niger River stemming from the disputed river 
boundary. In light of the ICJ’s decision, sixteen islands were awarded to Niger and nine 
to Benin.93 
 
Figure 3.  The Maritime Boundary between Benin and Niger.94 
The Benin and Niger model provides another option to resolve the Sir Creek 
dispute. Both Pakistan and India are in possession of previous records that can ascertain 
the position of Sir Creek at the time of Independence; therefore, the precedent of the 
ICJ’s decision from the case of Benin and Niger can also be used for Sir Creek’s case. 
The Benin and Niger case is also a viable option to resolve the Sir Creek dispute. 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 135. 
93 IRIN News, Benin-Niger: International Court Rules that Main Disputed Island Belongs to Niger not 
to Benin, (02 June 2012), Accessed 02 June 2012, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/55426/BENIN-NIGER-
International-Court-rules-that-main-disputed-island-belongs-to-Niger-not-Benin. 




C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE SIR 
CREEK DISPUTE 
The complexity and sensitivity of the Sir Creek dispute can be visualized from the 
fact that both countries have fought a war in the same area and pursued arbitration, but 
yet have not been able to solve the dispute. Ten bilateral rounds of discussion have been 
held since 1989. The last discussion was suspended after the tragic Mumbai attacks in 
2008. India believes that Pakistan is intentionally delaying the resolution process for 
some political reasons and may desire arbitration at a later date. On the other hand, India 
does not wish to involve itself with another arbitration tribunal and would prefer to 
resolve the dispute without involvement of a third party.95  
Over the past six decades, numerous geographical changes have arisen in Sir 
Creek; therefore, in reality, the Creek is somewhat different form the printed map of 
1914.96 Ansari and Vohra highlight the changes that are relevant to the dispute:  
The orientation of the creek has changed, creating a gap of approximately 
two kilometers from the point as marked in the 1914 map to the current 
outflow of the creek . . . The mouth of the creek has widened . . . An island 
has appeared near the mouth of the creek due to siltation, so that the 
boundary as marked on the 1914 map ends landwards of the tide line.97   
A need was felt to carry out a survey of the area before further dialogue on the same 
issue. In this regard, a joint land and hydrographic survey was conducted in 2007 before 
commencement of the tenth round of discussion. The survey revealed changes in the 
bathymetry, topography, and orientation of the creek. Both countries exchanged their 
charts along with their respective claims during the tenth round. At this point, they 
decided that their claims would be discussed in future rounds of talks, but the tragic 
Mumbai attacks suspended further discussion on this issue.  
Of great interest to both countries, it is necessary to resolve the Sir Creek dispute 
utilizing previous records so as to bring harmony and peace to the region. By concurring, 
                                                 
95 Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 18. 
96 Rear Admiral (Retd) KR. Menon, “Maritime Confidence Building in South Asia,” In Maritime 
Confidence Building in Regions of Tension, Report No 21, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, May 1996), 78. 
97 Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 18. 
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the step by step approach such as initially resolving this milder and less controversial 
maritime issue will strengthen the trust and cooperation which could lead both countries 
to resolve all outstanding bilateral issues including the Kashmir and Siachen Glacier 
issues. In light of the abovementioned case studies and norms of international law, some 
recommendations are proposed here to obtain a possible solution to the Sir Creek and 
maritime boundary disputes. 
1. Recommendation 1  
The existing record shows that the boundary of Sir Creek was first established in 
1914; therefore, first, it needs to be determined by how much Sir Creek has been shifted 
due to accretion since 1914. For this purpose, Pakistan and India should analyze British-
Indian maps prepared by the Surveyor General since 1914, the maps formulating during 
the process of erecting pillars in 1924, and those maps which were prepared in 1947 at 
the time of Independence. Moreover, sophisticated charts prepared during a recent survey 
of Sir Creek in 2007 that were subsequently exchanged as well by both states can also 
mark the exact location of Sir Creek as it presently exists.98  
When this analysis phase is completed and the exact location of Sir Creek at the 
time of Independence in 1947 will be established, the situation could be substantiated by 
the recent decision made by the ICJ in 2005 in the case of Benin and Niger’s maritime 
dispute. In this case the ICJ Chamber clearly defined the Niger River boundary by 
applying the thalweg principle on the status of the river that existed at the time of 
Independence in 1960. Therefore, Pakistan and India should agree to ascertain the 
position of Sir Creek at the time of 1947 and subsequently apply the same decision of the 
ICJ. 
2. Recommendation 2  
The 1982 United Nations Convention on International Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
offers to extend the jurisdiction of maritime states over adjoining seas. Articles 74 and 83 
(see footnote 47) of UNCLOS describe the process of delimitation of the EEZ and the 
 
                                                 
98 Sikander, “River Boundary Delimitation,” 404.  
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Continental Shelf. Resolution of maritime dispute between Suriname and Guyana is one 
of the empirical examples which could also be modeled to resolve the Sir Creek boundary 
dispute.   
Like Guyana and Suriname, Pakistan and India are also signatories to the 
UNCLOS; therefore, a tribunal should be constituted to analyze Pakistan and India’s 
claims over Sir Creek. The tribunal should first ascertain the status of the existing 
western land terminus, which is apparently agreeable to both states as it was undertaken 
in the Guyana and Suriname case, then find out if either thalweg is applicable (India’s 
claim) or if it will support Pakistan’s claim over Sir Creek. When the Sir Creek boundary 
dispute is resolved through this process, it will delimit the EEZ and Continental Shelf of 
both countries and through this way, both states’ maritime boundary will also be 
demarcated.  
3. Recommendation 3 
Before proposing recommendation three, it is necessary to understand perceptions 
of Pakistan and India regarding demarcation of maritime boundary which has been 
clearly marked by Agha in Figure 4.99 
                                                 
99 Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, “Sandia National Laboratories, Maritime Cooperation between India and 
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Figure 4.  Lines projected from Sir Creek show perceptions of Pakistan and India’s 
maritime boundary. Line X shows India’s perception, whereas line Y shows 
Pakistan’s perception.100 
The seaward approach in accordance with Technical Aspect on the Law of the 
Sea (TALOS)101 is another approach to resolve the maritime boundary issue between two 
adjacent states. This approach is also recommended by Vohra and Ansari.102 To apply 
                                                 
100 From Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, “Sandia National Laboratories, Maritime Cooperation between India 
and Pakistan: Building Confidence at Sea, Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 16, 2000. 
101 Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – 1982 
(IHO, IAG, IOC Advisory Board on Law of the Sea), Chapter 6. “The Equidistance Method: In maritime 
boundary delimitation an equidistance line is defined as a line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest points on the territorial sea baselines of two States. Article 15 refers to this line as a median line, 
but in the technical literature a distinction has often been made between a median line, defined as an 
equidistance line between two opposite States, and a lateral (equidistance) line, which is defined as an 
equidistance line between two adjacent States (see Appendix 1 of TALOS). In practice, the concept of 
adjacent and opposition are often difficult to define and apply, but the method used to determine an 
equidistance line is the same whatever the relationship of the coasts of the States. 
The equidistance method of constructing bilateral limits is a useful start to the technical process of 
delimitation because: a) it is the method that must be employed in the territorial sea in the absence of 
agreement or special circumstances; and b) it is a well-defined geometric method which is relatively easy to 
apply, particularly using modern computer methods (if the baselines are clearly defined) and it gives a 
unique line.” 
102 Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 12–15. 
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this method, two undisputed shore points are marked from the mainland of Pakistan and 
India. Figure 5 illustrates this proposed solution. A point of 200 nautical miles (the EEZ 
limit) is determined, equidistant from already marked shore points on the respective 
mainland.  
Following the same procedure, other points at 150, 100, 50, and 35 nautical miles 
are to be marked on the chart from the same mainland points.103 Then a point is to be 
marked on the mouth of Sir Creek equidistant from the positions claimed by India (Point-
1) and Pakistan (Point-K) as a solution without any bias to future claims.104 The line 
joining these points would be marked on chart and considered the maritime boundary 
between Pakistan and India. 
 
Figure 5.  Equidistance Method of Maritime Boundary Delimitation.105 







A peaceful South Asia demands good bilateral relations between Pakistan and 
India. Leadership on both sides must compromise on certain territorial claims, which 
could lead them to bring stability to the region, and this also enhances cooperation 
between both states. In this context, initially they should set aside more controversial 
issues like Kashmir and the Siachen Glacier, and give consideration to less politically 
volatile issues, such as the Sir Creek boundary issue, coupled with the maritime boundary 
delimitation issue, as a means of advancing the progress of peace in the region.  
Although the Sir Creek issue has a long and contentious history, at the heart of it, 
the issue is not difficult to manage. Its resolution is complex mainly because it has been 
consistently linked with the resolution of other hard-core issues. Why not decouple these 
issues or at least reverse the order of resolution, starting with such disputes as Sir Creek, 
which lend themselves more readily to answers?   
In principle, looking into the case studies of Guyana and Suriname, and Benin and 
Niger, it is evident that both decisions were taken on already laid principles of customary 
law—the thalweg principle and the ICJ Chamber’s judgment. Though the ICJ Chamber’s 
judgment had undermined the thalweg doctrine in Benin and Niger, in which case the 
principle governing the rightful possession of property applied, even then the decision 
was taken on the basis of records and history. In case of Sir Creek, similar records (old 
maps, charts, and letters) are available: a land and hydrographic survey was conducted in 
2007, and charts have also been exchanged by both sides. In short, the elements of a 
happy resolution are already in existence in the case of Sir Creek. 
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III. OTHER MARITIME PLIGHTS: THE FISHERMEN AND 
OPERATIONAL ENCOUNTERS ISSUES 
In the maritime domain, Pakistan and India carry two other prominent issues, such 
as the arrest and repatriation of fishermen and non-cooperative behavior of both sides’ 
maritime forces. The fishermen from both sides often cross the disputed and unidentified 
maritime boundaries in search of a good quality of fish, and, as penalties, the security 
forces arrest them, confiscate their boats, and hand them over to local police. In this 
process, the fishermen not only lose their fish and boats but also lose their livelihood and 
freedom for years. These arrests have a negative impact on the people’s perceptions, 
particularly on the families of victims, and also strain bilateral relations. Although for 
political purposes both sides’ governments release these fishermen on different occasions 
as goodwill gestures without any legal formalities, it cannot lessen the larger issue that 
remains an unresolved area between Pakistan and India. In addition, non-cooperative 
behavior and actions of naval forces also contribute to enhance political tension between 
both nations. The two major naval incidents including shooting down Pakistani maritime 
surveillance and the ASW aircraft, Atlantique, by Indian security forces, and brushing 
PNS Babur out at sea by INS Godavari have left a deep scar on bilateral relations of both 
nations. 
Nevertheless, in the game of politics and profits, the humanitarian problem of 
capturing the fishermen and maritime encounters between both sides’ navies is a 
continuous process. These issues could be resolved independently of the Sir Creek 
dispute for a net improvement in the overall state of relations between Pakistan and India. 
However, as part of a package of maritime issues, including Sir Creek, the legal and 
practical solutions to these issues could have an exponential effect on Pakistan-Indian 
relations, to say nothing of stability and prosperity in the affected areas. With this in 
mind, this chapter takes up the issues of fishermen and operational encounters at sea, 
seeking viable options for the resolution of these issues in light of two case studies: the 
fishermen dispute between South Korea and China for the former issue and the Incidents 




A. FISHERMEN ISSUE 
The arrests and seizures of fishermen and sea crews have become a continuous 
problem and cause a rise of tensions between Pakistan and India. For example, in the 
wake of the Mumbai attacks, in December 2, 2008, Indian maritime security forces seized 
a Pakistani cargo trawler in the Sir Creek area and arrested seven crew members of the 
trawler. They were held for conducting suspicious activities in the area. 
The Indian Ocean, the world’s third-largest sea, provides the bulk of the fish 
supply for domestic consumption to Pakistan and India. This industry is dominated in 
both states by traditional fishers. According to Charu Gupta and Mukul Sharma,  
The fishers of India and Pakistan have been children of the sea, and the 
ocean their shop floor . . . Fishing is not only an occupation for them but a 
way of life . . . They also play a large part in the prosperity of the two 
countries by earning a substantial foreign exchange.106  
In Pakistan and India, the fishing industry has come a long way since Independence and 
become a source of influential income, employment, and livelihood for the economically-
underdeveloped population. More than seven million people use fishing as a source of 
livelihood in Pakistan and India. Table 1 shows the development of fish production and 
export earnings.107 
  
                                                 
106 Charu. Gupta and Mukul. Sharma, “Blurred Bordered: Coastal Conflicts between India and 
Pakistan,” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 39, no. 27 (July 3–9, 2004), 3006.  
107 Hasan Ansari & Ravi Vohra, “CBMs at Sea,” 28. 
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Table 1.   Fish Production – India and Pakistan.108 
 1961–1962 1999–2000 2000–2001 2001–
2002 
Fish Production–India (tons)  
 
1,160,000 - 5,657,000 - 
Fish Production–Pakistan 
(tons) 
66,600 - 333,047 - 
Fish Export–India (million 
rupees) 




N/A 188.9 136.0 125.6 
 
Approximately 26,000 fishing crafts from Gujarat and 4,000 to 4,500 from Sindh 
operate along the coasts of the area.109 Although the exact data on Pakistani fishermen 
and fishing vessels are not readily available, the figures for the state of Gujarat’s fishing 
data appear in Table 2.110  
 
Table 2.   Fishing Data – State of Gujarat.111 
Length of the coastline of Gujarat  1,600 km 
Number of fishermen in Gujarat  140,208 
Number of fish landing centers  286 
Number of fishing villages  851 
Number of fishing vessels in Gujarat  
 
9,222 (traditional, non-motorized) 
5,391 (traditional, motorized) 
11,372 (mechanized) 
Total number of vessels  25,985 
 
However, this otherwise peaceable trade arouses becomes problematic with the 
multiple—and unavoidable—daily boundary crossings that come with following the 
                                                 
108 From Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 28, 2003. 
109 Moinuddin Ahmed, “Pakistani Fishing Industry in Doldrums,” Dawn, 29 January, 2001, cited by 
Hasan Ansari and Ravi Vohra, “CBMs at Sea,” 28. 
110 Ibid. 
111 From Ansari & Vohra, “Sandia National Laboratories Cooperative Monitoring Center,” 29, 2003. 
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fish.112 What’s more, fishermen of Pakistan and India carry out their fishing activities 
where both states share water in the Arabian Sea, off the Rann of Kutch coast and in the 
Sir Creek area. With an unclear maritime boundary, the fishermen cannot observe the 
niceties of international borders even if they wanted to do so; of course, the fish 
themselves rarely regard national boundaries. 
The unhappy upshot is the arrest of fishermen on both sides. The Indian Coast 
Guard (ICG) and the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) are the two bodies that 
conduct arrest operations in these areas. Each agency hands captured fishers over to the 
respective police authorities, who, in turn, charge the fishermen for violating maritime 
borders and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). At this moment, the full force of the 
state’s coercive power falls on these hapless individuals, who almost certainly had not 
undertaken their day’s work with subversive political intent. Gupta and Sharma cast this 
dilemma in post-modern terms:  
These fisher-folk become deviants and suspects in the eyes of the state, as 
they resist established identities, and undermine stated boundaries . . . The 
state thus has to discipline, manage, contain, control and regulate their 
bodies at all cost, bringing them under constant surveillance . . . 
Statements of security are inevitably inscribed upon, and made through, 
the body of the arrested fishermen . . . The body of the fisher-folk is 
tortured in an attempt to avenge the daily affronts to the might of the state, 
whose borders they have permeated . . . The result has been the use of 
physical force, threat, violence, arrests, and even killings, justified in the 
name of sovereignty of the state.113 
1. Dilemma of Both States’ Fishermen  
On April 12, 2012, an Indian fisherman, Samant Lakshman Bambhaniya, who is 
suffering from cancer, was freed from Malir Jail at Karachi, Pakistan along with twenty-
five other Indian fishermen as a goodwill gesture. These twenty-five fishermen were 
repatriated via the land border Wagah (Lahor, Pakistan), and Lakshman was flown back 
to his home in Gujarat, India. Lakshman explained how he got into his predicament: 
“[T]here was no one else in my family to earn a living. I was suffering from bone cancer 
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and had spent a lot of money on my treatment. Other members of my family were ill, too, 
and I began working as a fisherman to pay off my debts.”114 In the course of this work, 
Lakshman became embroiled in a much larger issue between Pakistan and India when he 
was picked up by the Pakistani Navy. He was charged with illegally crossing the 
maritime boundary of Pakistan and was detained in the jail for seven months before the 
mutual amnesty came.  
Lakshman’s case is not unique; some 423 Indian fishermen remain detained in the 
same jail (Malir, Karachi). At the same time, more than 150 Pakistani fishermen are 
detained in Indian jails for violating the maritime boundary. They may remain in jail for 
years.115 While neither government makes much of these cases at present, the human cost 
is considerable. Mai Khatoo, wife of a Pakistani fisherman who was released after several 
years from Indian prison said, “You cannot imagine the pain and agony I went through 
when my husband was imprisoned in India. Besides, worrying about his safety, I had to 
work day and night to feed five children as he was the only bread earner.”116 Table 3 
shows the number of both sides’ fishermen imprisoned for border incursion.117 
  
                                                 
114 Rediff News, “Pakistan Releases 26 Indian Fishermen,” (April 12, 2012 17:42 IST), Accessed May 
15, 2012, http://www.rediff.com/news/report/pakistan-releases-26-indian-fishermen/20120412.htm. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Charu. Gupta and Mukul. Sharma, “Blurred Bordered,” 3011. 
117 Dawn, January 17, 2010; The Hindu, January 2, 2010; Pakistan-India Judicial Committee on 
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information about the date of arrest, details of sentence, charges under which the prisoner was sentenced 
and the expected date of release.” See PILER, “Pakistan Institute of Labor Education and Research: 




Table 3.   Detained Fishermen claimed by both countries.118  




April 2008 14 410 
July 2008 378 412 
January 2009 Not submitted 343 
July 2009 Not submitted 535 
January 2010 Not submitted 510 
 
Both states keep these prisoner fishermen completely in the dark from the time of 
their arrest. Most of them remain in jail for years without being tried. Those who are 
convicted are not released even after they have served their full sentences. They wait for 
years for the announcement of a formal exchange of fishermen by the two countries, like 
the one that freed Lakshman. This mutual amnesty usually takes place according to the 
same exchange control procedure followed for the release or exchange of prisoners of 
war. The occasions of release and exchange normally depend on the relations of both 
governments,119 and they are often timed to coincide with Secretaries’ meetings, Prime 
Ministers’ meetings, regional forum meetings, and local commanders’ meetings. Such 
gestures may resolve a particular case, but the larger issue remains a sore area between 
Pakistan and India. All the while, as Lakshman stated, the fisher-folk meant only to 
pursue their livelihood and feed their families. These incarcerations represent one more 
negative incident in the minds of the public on both sides; collectively, they strain 
bilateral relations as well. On some occasions, these fishermen are used for political 
purposes, when both sides’ governments release them as goodwill gestures without any 
legal process. Table 4 shows the data on recently released fishermen on different 
occasions.120 
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Table 4.   Number of Fishermen Released and the Occasions.121 
Date Number of Released 
Fishermen 
Occasions 
Aug. 14, 2007 48 Pakistani fishermen 
& 100 Indian fishermen 




Nov. 25, 2008 29 Pakistani fishermen 
& 101 Indian fishermen 
 
Preceded by Home Secretary 
Meeting 
Dec. 25, 2009 99 Indian fishermen Goodwill gesture by Prime Minister 
Jan. 2, 2010 31 Pakistani Fishermen Response to Pakistan gesture 
 
2. Current Developments for Facilitation of Fishermen  
Although the families and relatives of Pakistani and Indian fishermen have been 
raising the issue with the authorities on both sides, along with media accounts 
highlighting the painful stories of these fishermen, both governments have been slow to 
post any official recognition or progress. In the mid-nineties, several Pakistan- and India-
based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) became involved to establish the 
detentions of fishermen as human rights violations. The leading organizations in Pakistan 
include Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP); the Pakistan Institute of Labor, 
Education, and Research (PILER); and the Anjuman Samaji Behbood of Ibrahim Hydri in 
Karachi, which later became the Pakistan Fisher-folk Forum (PFF).122 The apprehension 
of fishers did not stop, but the communities and human rights activists got more vocal 
about curtailing the arrests of fishermen at sea. Additionally, another organization known 
as the South Asian Labor Forum (SALF) also surfaced, calling attention to the plight of 
the fishermen as a human rights violation, which made this issue of international-level 
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concern. Because of the combined efforts of these organizations, the fishermen have 
come begun to figure in the Pakistan-India dialogues and foreign relations.123   
Moreover, a joint judicial body known as the Pakistan-India Judicial Committee 
was formed in January, 2007, comprising eight retired judges from Pakistan and India. 
Justice (Retd) A. S. Gill and Justice (Retd) M. A. Khan from the Indian side, and Justice 
(Retd) Nasir Aslam Zahid and Justice (Retd) Mian Muhammad Ajmal from Pakistani 
side visited the jails. The judges were appointed to inspect the situation of detained 
civilians in the jails of other nations, exclusively the fishermen who were imprisoned for 
casting across the territorial waters. They have also been assigned to help facilitate the 
release of these prisoners. 
After the Committee’s initial meeting on February 26, 2008, in New Delhi, and an 
exchange of lists of prisoners on April 1, 2008, the members124 of the Committee visited 
jails in Pakistan (Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Lahore) from June 9 to June 13, 2008, and in 
India (Amritsar, Delhi, and Jaipur) from August 18 to August 23, 2008.125 The 
Committee recommended several points for consideration, including: (1) if a national of 
the other country dies in jail, actions must be taken by either country to immediately 
inform the High Commission126 of the other country in writing of the death of the 
prisoner; (2) the federal/central government of each country will also issue instructions to 
the Inspectorate-General of all the provinces and the Home Department for strict 
compliance; (3) instructions may be issued for providing copies of the inquiry report (if 
any) and any post-mortem report of the deceased prisoner to the other country’s High 
Commission; (4) within three weeks of death, the body of a deceased prisoner will be 
handed over to his or her country; (5) juveniles, women, and prisoners who are seriously 
ill or disabled (physically or mentally) deserve humanitarian consideration and may be 
released on compassionate grounds whether they are awaiting trial or convicted; and (6) 
prisoners locked up for such minor offences as visa violation, border-crossing, and 
                                                 
123 Ibid. 
124 Around 46 Pakistani prisoners at Central Jail Tihar, New Delhi, 98 at Central Jail, Jaipur and 45 at 
Central Jail, Amritsar were presented before the committee. 
125 The News On Sunday, “Aman Ki Asha: Both Governments Lack Political Will,” Accessed July 20, 
2012, http://amankiasha.com/sp_english_detail.asp?id=52. 
126 An embassy of one British Commonwealth country to another. 
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violation of the Foreigner Act also deserve humanitarian and compassionate 
consideration.127  
Unfortunately, neither government gave much consideration to the 
recommendations of the Committee. Justice (retd) Nasir Aslam Zahid, a member of the 
Committee, noted:  
The government has failed to provide us with effective practical support. 
There are no funds available to us to even hold our meetings regularly. 
Our recommendations have not been implemented either and here too, the 
two governments lack political will to make it a robust and active 
committee. The governments’ purported concern over the issue remains 
largely on paper only.128 
3. Case Study – South Korea and China Fishermen Dispute 
The arresting of fishermen, nationals of one country, by another country’s 
security forces is not a unique issue. Similar incidents take place among other coastal 
nations in the world. However, most nations have bilaterally resolved these disputes by 
establishing certain rules and agreements, whereas over the last six decades, Pakistan and 
India have failed to determine a manageable solution to this critical humanitarian dispute. 
In this regard, the resolution of the fishers’ dispute between South Korea and China 
provides a case study to ascertain the possible solution to the fishermen dispute between 
Pakistan and India. 
The East China Sea has a continental shelf of nearly 161,987 square nautical 
miles; and most of the sea is less than 200 meters deep. The shelf inclines from the 
Chinese and Korean coasts and abruptly drops into the Okinawa Trough, nearly 2,300 
meters deep.129 China and South Korea have overlapping shelf claims in the western part 
of East China Sea; they also have small areas of overlap in their EEZ claims in the 
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northern East China Sea.130 Incidents of Korean fishing vessels seized by the Chinese 
authorities occurred from time to time in the area within the East China Motor Trawl 
Prohibition Line131 (the so-called Mao Tse-Tung Line), as claimed by China in the early 
1950s. Thus, the Korean government had to advise Korean fishing vessels not to 
approach the Mao Tse-Tung Line for their own safety.  
As there were no diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and 
People’s Republic of China during the Cold War, talks for a fishers’ agreement between 
Korea and China at the government level were not possible.132 Thus, in 1975 the Korean 
government drew a fishing operation (fisheries) restriction line along and off the Mao 
Tse-Teung Line to keep Korean fishing vessels from approaching the Line.133 Since the 
mid-1980s, as Chinese fishing vessels became very active and thus disputes at sea 
between the fishing vessels of Korea and China frequently arose. The fishermen’s 
organizations, instead of the governments, of the two countries concluded an informal 
“agreement for dealing with disputes between their fishing vessels at sea” in 1989.134 Of 
significance here is that the two states did not establish normal diplomatic relations until 
1992. 
                                                 
130 Ibid., 144–146. 
131 Sun Pyo. Kim, “The UNCLOS Convention and New Fisheries Agreements in North East Asia,”1–
22, Accessed August 8, 2012, www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/common/download. Jsp. He further explained 
that, “The East China Motor Trawl Prohibition Line was drawn on December 16, 1950 by the Fisheries 
Management Bureau of the East China Military Administration Committee. The line is 30–70 miles from 
the Chinese shore.” See also Choon-ho Park, “Fishing under Troubled Waters: The North East Asia 
Fisheries Controversy,” 2 Ocean Development and International Law (1974), 114–115. 
132 The Republic of Korea had diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) until 1992. In 
the Korean War between 1950–1953, the People’s Republic of China’s volunteer military troops 
participated in the war to assist North Korea. After the Cold War, the Republic of Korea established 
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China cutting off the diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China. Since 1992, China has maintained diplomatic relations both with the Republic of Korea 
and the People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). See Ibid. 
133 Rules on Safety of Vessel Operation, announced in 1968, amended thereafter several times, See 
Ibid.  
134 Since the late 1990s, the number of Chinese fishing vessels found fishing in the territorial waters of 
Korea has increased rapidly. The number was 249 vessels in 1991, but it was 472 in 1995. According to 
statistics by the Korean Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the number of Chinese fishing vessels 
seized by the Agency on charge of illegal fishing in the territorial waters of Korea are 15 in 1992, 17 in 
1993, 17 in 1994, 45 in 1995, 45 in 1996, 39 in 1997, 31 in 1998, 60 in 1999, and 24 in 2000. See Ibid.  
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a. Negotiations Process  
China and Korea began to negotiate for a formal fisheries agreement in 
1993, a year after they established diplomatic relations. In the early stages of the 
negotiations, China argued that all the area between the outer limits of the territorial 
waters of the two countries should be a joint fishing zone until the final delimitation of 
EEZ boundaries. In contrast, Korea argued that EEZ fishing management should be 
applied in the largest possible area, with a minimal joint fishing zone.135 While the 
negotiations made little progress, massive fishing activities were conducted by Chinese 
fishermen off the Korean coasts.  
In September 1997, four years after the first round of talks, Korea and 
China agreed in principle to establish joint fishing zones in the middle of the Yellow 
Sea.136 Starting in December 1997, various proposals on how to shape this joint fishing 
zone were exchanged between the two countries.137 Still, Korea wished to set up a 
narrow joint fishing zone, whereas China pressed for a wide joint fishing zone. In this 
situation, the idea of “transitional zones” (see Figure 4) was introduced in September 
1998 to settle the dilemma in the negotiations on the shape of the joint fishing zone. The 
two states decided to establish two transitional zones: one is situated between the joint 
fishing zone and Korea’s zone, which is regarded as Korea’s EEZ for the purpose of the 
fisheries agreement; and the other transitional zone is situated between the joint fishing 
zone and China’s zone. Fishermen from both Korea and China can fish in the transitional 
zones until the fourth year after the entry into force of the fisheries agreement, and then 
the transitional zones revert to the zones where each state can exercise its sovereign rights 
on fishing for the purpose of the fisheries agreement. After settling the different views on 
                                                 
135 Korea also proposed that two countries adopt a vertical line, as a fisheries boundary, which equally 
divides the Yellow Sea in size if the delimitation takes some time: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of 
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136 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea and The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries, Exposition on Korea-China Fisheries Agreement (written in Korean, unpublished), April 1999, 
7–9. See Ibid. 
137 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea and The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries, Exposition on Korea-China Fisheries Agreement (written in Korean, unpublished), April 1999, 
8–9. See Ibid. 
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the shape of the joint fishing zone and transitional zones, the two countries were able to 
initialize the fisheries agreement in November 1998.138 It took another two years from 
that step for the two governments to sign the agreement, and finally the parties agreed to 
bring the Korean-Chinese Fisheries Agreement into force on June 30, 2001.139 
 
Figure 6.  Zones between Korea and China.140  
                                                 
138 The Korea Herald, 12 November 1999. See Ibid. 
139 “Korean Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries”, Press Release, 5 April 2001, available at 
www. momaf. go.kr. See Ibid. 
140 From Sun Pyo. Kim, “The UNCLOS Convention and New Fisheries Agreements in North East 
Asia,”1–22, Accessed August 8, 2012, www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/common/download. Jsp. 
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b. Allocation of Zones  
As the Korean-Chinese Fisheries Agreement is a provisional arrangement 
of a practical nature as seen in Paragraph 3 of Article 74 of the LOS Convention, it shall 
be without prejudice to the final delimitation of EEZs. For the sake of a double safeguard, 
the “without-prejudice clause” is adopted in the Fisheries Agreement, providing that: “No 
provision in this Agreement shall be interpreted in such a way as to prejudice the position 
of either Contracting Party on issues in the law of the sea.”141  
The shape of the Provisional Measure Zone in the Yellow Sea is not a 
modified form of overlapping claims of EEZ by both parties. In negotiating the shape of 
the Provisional Measure Zone, representatives of both parties posited a hypothetical line 
that equally divides the Yellow Sea.142 Similarly, the two Transitional Zones off the 
China Sea coasts of both states are almost the same size.143 It means that both countries’ 
fishermen enjoy fishing activities in an equal area, so it could also minimize the chances 
of hostility by both the countries in the future for the size of the area.  
In the Provisional Measure Zone, fishing vessels are only subject to the 
enforcement jurisdiction of the state of which flag the vessels are flying.144 In the 
Transitional Zones, as in the Provisional Measure Zone, enforcement authorities of one 
party cannot exercise enforcement jurisdiction against the fishing vessels of the other 
party.145 Joint monitoring and surveillance measures can take place in Transitional 
Zones;146 however, even if the joint monitoring and surveillance is applied, a law 
                                                 
141 Article 14 of the Korean-Chinese Agreement. A question arises here why the agreement adopted 
the term “issues in the law of the sea” rather than the term “issues in the law of the sea other than fisheries.” 
Because obviously the fisheries’ agreement can have an effect of modifying the rights and obligations of 
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the agreement affect each Party’s position on the issues of fisheries though it is a provisional arrangement: 
Note that the fisheries’ agreement between China and Japan also adopts the same language in its without-
prejudice clause. See Ibid. 
142 Record of Negotiations on Sino-Korean Fisheries Talks (recorded in Korean for internal use, 
unpublished), 1998. See Ibid. 
143 Transitional Zone in the Korean side is 28.716 sq. km and the Transitional Zone in the Chinese 
side is 26,192 sq. km; calculated by using a delimitation software Delma.    
144 Paragraph 2 and 3 of Article 7 the Korean-Chinese Fisheries Agreement. 
145 Paragraph 3 of Article 8 of the Korean-Chinese Fisheries Agreement. 
146 Paragraph 3 of Article 8 of the Korean-Chinese Fisheries Agreement. 
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enforcement officer of one party would not be able to initiate enforcement when he/she is 
onboard a fishing vessel of the other party with an officer of the other party because the 
agreement clearly states that “each Contracting Party may not apply management or other 
measures to nationals and fishing vessels of the other Party” in the joint fishing zones.147 
There is no provision which alludes to this strict application of flag-state jurisdiction 
being relaxed in a case of joint monitoring and surveillance. In this case, another form of 
cooperation is applied in addition to the joint monitoring and surveillance scheme, i.e., 
when one country’s security force finds a fishing craft of the other country conducting 
fishing activities with a violation of decisions made by the Joint Fisheries Committee of 
Korea and Chinese in either Provisional Measure Zones or Transitional Zones, then the 
attention of the country will be drawn to the violation at sea, and will notify the other 
country. The violator country will take necessary actions with regards to the vessel 
violating the rules and must satisfy the country who reported the violation. 
c. Current Fishing Pattern 
Besides the Provisional Measure Zone and Transitional Zones, there are 
areas where the “current fishing patterns” will be maintained. It appears that this 
expression was intended to indicate “free fishing activities” that the nationals and fishing 
vessels of the two countries have enjoyed thus far in most parts of the sea between 
them.148 In the Current Fishing Patterns Zone, the two parties are not to apply their laws 
and regulations on fisheries against nationals and fishing vessels of the other country, 
unless agreed otherwise between the two parties.149  
Where are the areas where free fishing activities can take place in the 
Yellow Sea and in the East China Sea? According to the complicated language of Article 
9 of the Fisheries Agreement, the Current Fishing Pattern Zones are “certain areas,” one 
of which is situated to the north of the Provisional Measure Zone and the other to the 
                                                 
147 Paragraph 3 of Article 7 and Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Korean-Chinese Fisheries Agreement.  
148 The term “current fishing pattern” might seem inappropriate for a term to indicate “free fishing” 
because both Korea and China already proclaimed their respective EEZ when they initialed the fishing 
agreement in 1998. It appears that negotiators of both countries had begun to use the term “current fishing 
pattern” before both countries proclaimed their respective EEZ. See Ibid.    
149 Article 9 of the Korean-Chinese Fisheries Agreement. 
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south of the Provisional Measure Zone and Transitional Zones.150 In other words, 
fishermen of Korea and China can engage in free fishing activities in these “certain 
areas” situated to the north of the Provisional Measure Zone and also in “certain areas” 
situated to the south of the Provisional Measure Zone and the Transitional Zones, unless 
there is a special agreement to the contrary. As the term “certain” implies, not all the area 
situated to the north of the Provisional Measure Zone and not all the areas to the south of 
the Provisional Measure Zone and Transitional Zones would be the areas where the free-
fishing activities are to be guaranteed. 
Even after Korea and China settled this problem, they required further 
negotiations to settle their divergent views on how far south the southern limits of the 
Current Fishing Pattern Zones extended.151 In the negotiations, Korea argued that the 
southern limits line of Current Fishing Patterns Zone between Korea and China should be 
drawn at Lat. 29° 43′ N., where the 200-mile line reaches from Korea’s southernmost 
island of Mara-do. The parallel of Lat. 29° 43′ N. is far south of the parallel of Lat. 30° 
40′ N., at which the northern limits line of the Sino-Japanese Provisional Measure Zone 
is drawn. Thus, in the argument, Korea challenged the legality of the northern limits line 
of the Provisional Measure Zone between Japan and China, stressing that the Sino-
Japanese line was drawn without consultation with Korea, and Korea’s EEZ claims go 
further south beyond the line. Korea and China at last agreed to set the southern limits of 
the Current Fishing Pattern Zone between Korea and China at Lat. 29° 40′ N., under the 
condition that Korean fishermen should observe seasonal fishing restrictions in the areas 
where Chinese fishermen are observing them.152 
                                                 
150 Article 9 of the Korean-Chinese Fisheries Agreement.  
151 No such differences arose between Korea and China with regard to the area situated in the north of 
the Provisional Measure Zone once they reached the understanding that Chinese fishermen are not allowed 
to fish in the Korea’s Special Prohibition Zone, because the fishing activities by Korean fishermen are not 
active elsewhere other than the Special Prohibition Zone in the area to the north of the Provisional Measure 
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Sun Pyo. Kim, “The UNCLOS Convention and New Fisheries Agreements in North East Asia,”1–22, 
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152 Korean Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, “Situations of the Korea-China Fisheries 
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4. Recommendations for Possible Solutions for the Fishermen Dispute 
Even when the international maritime boundary issue between Pakistan and India 
is resolved, it is unlikely that the fishermen will completely stop crossing into the other 
state’s waters. However, the establishment of good communication, coordination, and 
operational cooperation between both states’ maritime security forces may serve to 
mitigate the suffering of fishermen in general and their families in particular.153 The 
following recommendations will help to resolve the issue in a peaceful manner: 
a. Recommendation 1  
In light of Korea-China case study, different zones should be established 
within the disputed maritime boundary in order to allow the fishermen not only to operate 
without fear of arrest but also to use their traditional fishing methods. These zones would 
provide an opportunity for both countries to share the trans-boundary migratory fish 
resources. Both countries’ fishing craft would be prohibited from crossing the outer limits 
of their respective zones, which would be marked with buoys. Fishing licenses may be 
granted to a certain number of the other country’s fishing crafts on a seasonal or yearly 
basis, limiting them to catch a specific quantity of fish. The total catch of fish would have 
to be regulated on a yearly basis.154  
For this purpose, a joint commission would be constituted establishing the 
types and number of craft for both countries that may be allowed to conduct fishing in the 
zones, the annual catch quantity, and the type of fish. The commission would also resolve 
cases of violations. Moreover, security forces’ aircraft and ships would patrol to warn and 
escort these fishing craft restricting them to their respective zones, and security forces 
would be instructed not to arrest the fishermen unless they are found to be involved in 
such illegal activities as smuggling and human trafficking.155     
                                                 
153 Hasan Ansari & Ravi Vohra, “CBMs at Sea,” 31. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid., 31–32. 
51 
 
b. Recommendation 2  
In the case of arrest of fishermen, the fishing craft would be returned to 
their respective countries upon completion of the necessary formalities and legal trials, 
and the arrested fishermen released and repatriated after registering the case. Moreover, 
both countries’ fishing communities/unions should be informed to provide necessary help 
for expediting the legal formalities. They would be encouraged to remain in contact with 
each other electronically for faster correspondence.   
Ansari and Vohra have suggested some useful technological steps to aid 
the fishermen as well as facilitate the securing of the area, including:  
(1)  Installation of warning aids on undisputed land on either side of the coast 
that could be equipped with a transponder designed with tracking and 
audio warnings to stop craft that appear intent on crossing the boundary 
limits. The equipment will also transfer this electronic information to both 
sides’ security forces to take timely actions against these craft.  
(2)  Installation of high intensity light in the red and green sectors for night 
navigation, which could indicate to the fishermen to avoid the other 
country’s territory. 
(3)  Installation of onboard warning aids that could aid the captains of fishing 
craft. It may be difficult for traditional fishing craft but vessels of 18 to 20 
meters in length or more may be directed to carry a transponder and global 
positioning system (GPS) that could provide their precise 
latitude/longitude position.156  
c. Recommendation 3  
At central locations in Pakistan and India, data banks could be created to 
maintain a record of all fishermen and their fishing craft. These data banks would be 
networked with other fishing harbors of the respective areas. Captains of the fishing craft 
would be instructed to submit a detailed list of crew members and their particulars. 
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Fishing authorities would be made responsible for maintaining and updating the data 
bank offices.  
In case of arrests, this measure would aid the fishing authorities to identify 
the seized craft and their crew. In addition, it will help them in crew tagging and craft 
tracking.157 Once the respective networking process is matured, both countries should 
link the system with each other. This connection will provide an opportunity at both ends 
to ascertain easily the status of fishermen and establish their identity without any doubt in 
case of arrests. The data may also be made accessible to the fishermen unions and they 
will help to expediently develop the database. 
B. OPERATIONAL ENCOUNTERS 
In more than six decades, Pakistan and India could not develop good bilateral 
relations because of mistrust, suspicion, and hostility. In parallel, both the countries have 
been engaged in different forms of dialogues and summits in developing cooperation and 
reducing tension but unfortunately have not yet succeeded. Military-to-military relations 
of both countries also reveal a disturbing trend. One of the aspects of this trend can be 
seen in the Arabian Sea where Pakistani and Indian naval forces engage in dangerous 
maneuvers158 by coming close to each other and routinely monitoring each other’s 
activities. On one hand, shadowing and buzzing Indian Navy ships and aircraft by the 
Pakistan Navy is a common practice while operating at sea or on the passage to the 
Persian Gulf. On the other hand, the Indian Navy cannot be acquitted on this account 
because when Pakistan Navy ships and aircraft are on their way to Southeast Asia or 
engaging in exercises in the Arabian Sea, the Indian Navy routinely undertakes similar 
activities.159 During these activities, both sides’ navies remained silent. Some of these 
shadowing and buzzing incidents are: (1) in 1983, an Indian ship (Kashin II class 
destroyer) nearly opened fire on a Pakistani Atlantique aircraft; (2) in 1996, an Indian 
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Navy Sea King helicopter was shadowing the Pakistan Navy’s annual Sea Spark exercise, 
and a collision between Pakistan Navy’s Allouette helicopter and India’s Sea King was 
barely avoided; and (3) in August 1995, the navies of Pakistan and India were invited to 
Indonesia for the International Fleet Review, where the Indian Navy claimed that the 
Pakistan Navy Allouette helicopter flew dangerously close over an Indian warship at 
anchor in the port of Tanjung Priok.160 Sakhuja has mentioned an Indian Navy official’s 
statement that, “every time our warships enter the northern Arabian Sea, it is shadowed 
by either an Orion or an Atlantique. We do the same to them using our Bears, IL-38s, 
Dornier-228s and Sea Kings.”161   
Keeping in view the nature of these incidents that occurred between Pakistani and 
Indian navies, it can be argued that both sides have shown tolerance despite being 
traditional rivals, but most of these incidents have gone unreported other than few 
diplomatic protests. However, two major maritime incidents badly deteriorated the 
bilateral relations between both the countries when India shot down Pakistani Atlantique 
aircraft in the Rann of Kutch area, and both countries’ ships brushed each other in the 
Arabian Sea. These two incidents that increased distrust between both the governments in 
general and both the navies in particular will be discussed in detail below.  
1. Atlantique Incident 
On August 10, 1999, the Pakistan Navy’s ASW aircraft Atlantique was shot down 
by the Indian Air Force’s aircraft with air-to-air missiles in which sixteen Navy personnel 
were killed. The incident happened in the Sindh province of Pakistan south of Badin, 30–
40 miles north of the coastline of Pakistan in the area of Rann of Kutch.162 The 
Atlantique is a maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and the version that Pakistan has carries 
modern weapons including air-to-surface missiles. The Pakistan Navy uses these aircraft 
in anti-submarine and anti-ship roles. When the aircraft was shot down, Pakistan and 
India had two different viewpoints.  
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a. Pakistan’s Stance 
The unarmed Atlantique aircraft carrying sixteen crew members onboard 
was on a routine training mission. The Indian Air Force aircraft fired an air-to-air missile 
without warning when Atlantique was flying over Pakistan’s air space. Pakistan 
considered this an act of unprovoked military aggression and contravention of 
international norms relating to sovereignty of national borders.163 At 0915 hours (PST), 
the aircraft took off from Pakistan Navy Aviation Base PNS Mehran, informing the 
Karachi civil airport of the flight plan before the flight in accordance with standard 
operating procedures. The aircraft was flying at a height of 7,000–9,000 feet in the 
general area of operation approximately 70 to 90 miles east of Karachi. Radar contact 
was maintained throughout its flight within Pakistan air space till it was lost at 1055 
hours. The aircraft was carrying out training exercises and maneuvers in the same area of 
Pakistan air space from 1030 to 1055 hours until it was shot down. Upon losing the radar 
contact, other Pakistani aircraft and helicopters were tasked to carry out an intensive 
search around 1206 hours. They discovered the wreckage of Atlantique around 1455 
hours and reported the scattered wreckage within the radius of one kilometer and two 
kilometers inside the Pakistani territory.164 When the radar contact was lost and other 
Pakistani aircraft and helicopters were tasked to reach the area for search, there was a 
time gap of about two hours. During this time, Indian helicopters sneaked into the 
territory of Pakistan to remove part of the wreckage in order to produce some evidence 
for claiming that Atlantique was shot down in India’s territory. All these events led 
Pakistan to claim that Atlantique was shot down inside Pakistan’s territory, and India had 
violated Pakistan air space and territorial sovereignty.165  
b. India’s Stance 
India insisted that at 1051 hours (IST) an Indian Air Force’s ground radar 
detected Pakistan’s Atlatique aircraft in the Sindh region of Pakistan, and was observed 
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approaching the international border with a speed of 199.8 nautical miles/hour 
maintaining a height of 3000–3500 feet. At 1054 hours, the aircraft reached the top of the 
international border and conducted a series of maneuvers over the same area.166 When 
the aircraft crossed the border, India considered the aircraft to be on a spy mission, and 
tasked two MIG-21 fighter interceptors from the IAF Air Base at Naliya to counter the 
efforts of Atlantique. The MIG-21 interceptors succeeded in intercepting the Atlantique 
within ten kilometers of India’s territory. The MIGs forced the Atlantique to escort it to a 
nearby Indian base, but the Atlantique turned back towards the border. When the MIGs’ 
pilot observed that the Atlanque was not intending to land, one of the pursuing MIGs 
fired a missile and hit the Atlantique’s port engine around 2.7 nautical miles short of the 
international border.167 The Atlantique was last sighted on Indian radar at 1123 hours. 
According to Bharat Rakshak,  
There was no alternative thereafter but to shoot down the Pakistani 
intruder to prevent it from running away after being caught while on an 
obvious illegal operational mission in Indian territory . . . the IAF acted as 
per the existing Rules of Engagement (ROE), even going so far as to give 
the intruder a chance for survival which was rejected.168 
In response to India’s stance, Pakistan knocked on the door of the United 
Nations, and requested the UN Secretary General to conduct a “fact-finding mission” so 
as to ascertain the truth behind the shooting down of Pakistan’s unarmed aircraft. The 
Secretary General informed the government of Pakistan that India had shown a negative 
response to investigating the case through a third party; therefore, they were unable to 
send a mission into the region for fact finding since this requires the full cooperation of 
all the parties.169 Pakistan also made a formal appeal through India’s High Commission 
in Islamabad that the incident has left Pakistan with the loss of an aircraft and her crew; 
therefore, India should pay an amount of U.S.$60.2 million to Pakistan as compensation. 
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India publically rejected Pakistan’s claim and closed all doors for possible negotiations. 
Moreover, Pakistan insisted that India had also not launched any investigation to 
ascertain the responsibility of the incident nor informed Pakistan as per existing 
obligations mentioned in the Prevention of Airspace Violations Agreement between both 
countries.170     
Nevertheless, Pakistan realized that India is neither willing to accept the 
UN’s fact-finding mission, nor agree for direct bilateral negotiations; therefore, Pakistan 
invoked the International Court of Justice to determine the international responsibility of 
India that includes the payment of compensation money and settling the dispute between 
both the countries. However, the complaint was not entertained and subsequently 
dismissed by the ICJ, because India had filed an exemption171 in 1974, concerning 
disputes between India and others that are or have been members of the Commonwealth 
of Nations.172 The Court agreed with India’s position that it lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain the case, and stated that as the Commonwealth reservation raised by India was 
valid under Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute,173 it was unnecessary for [it] to 
                                                 
170 Agreement between India and Pakistan on prevention of air space violations and for permitting 
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consider India’s objection based on the reservation concerning multilateral treaties. The 
Court’s decision did not help resolve the issue. 
2. Incident between Naval Ships  
On August 2, 2010, Somali pirates hijacked an Egyptian owned vessel MV Suez 
comprising a Pakistani captain with three other Pakistani, six Indians, eleven Egyptians, 
and one Sri Lankan as crew members. The vessel remained in the pirates’ custody for 
eleven months. The initial demand of ransom money by the pirates is not confirmed; 
however, a Pakistani human rights activist, Ansar Burney, negotiated with the pirates and 
brought down the demand to U.S.$2.1 million.174 Since the Egyptian owner was not in 
possession of appropriate insurance, and was unwilling to pay the ransoms,175 Ansar 
Burney launched a campaign for soliciting donations, and succeeded in paying the 
ransom against securing the release of the vessel along with all the crew members on 
June 13, 2011. 
On return passage to Pakistan, the vessel was again reportedly attacked by the 
pirates; however, the crew of the vessel managed to foil the attempts.176 At that time PNS 
Babur was operating as part of the multinational combined task force (CTF). Upon 
tasking PNS Babur by the government of Pakistan, the ship responded to the call, and 
rescued the MV Suez’s crew after thwarting the pirates’ attack. PNS Babur then 
commenced escorting the MV Suez to prevent the vessel from further attacks.177 At the 
same time and in a strange twist, the government of India tasked Indian Navy Ship 
Godavari to help MV Suez while PNS Babur was already escorting the vessel. When INS 
                                                                                                                                                 
• The interpretation of a treaty. 
• Any question of international law. 
• The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
obligation. 
• The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. 
174 R S. Vasan, “Case Study of MV Suez and Anti-Piracy Operations: Lessons for India and 
Pakistan,” (vol. 5 no. 4 October, 2011), 118. 
175 Christian. Bueger, “The Human Face of Piracy: Pakistan’s Response,” (Piracy Studies Academic 
Research on Contemporary Martime Piracy, March 12, 2012), accessed August 8, 2012, http://piracy-
studies.org/2012/the-human-face-of-piracy-pakistans-response/. 




Godavari reached there, both ships INS Godavari and PNS Babur conducted dangerous 
maneuvers. During this mid-sea encounter, both ships brushed against each other which 
led to Pakistan and India accusing each other for conducting aggressive mid-sea 
maneuvers and muddying a humanitarian operation. 
a. Pakistan’s Response 
Pakistan tasked its naval ship to intervene, escort, and provide necessary 
assistance to MV Suez. R. S. Vasan noted that,  
“The action by the Pakistan naval ship has come in for raise and the crew 
profusely thanked Ansar Burney for raising the funds required for the 
release of the ship and the Pakistani authorities for their timely help. 
Unfortunately, both the Indian Navy and the government of India came in 
for lot of flak due to the lack of timely action to protect the crew. Even the 
role of the Indian diplomats in Cairo has been criticized for lacking 
assertive proactive action.”178  
In response to the mid-sea encounter, the government of Pakistan lodged a complaint 
through the Indian High Commission in Islamabad accusing INS Godavari for brushing 
PNS Babur. The complaint highlighted that,  
“INS Godavari not only hampered humanitarian operations being carried 
out by Pakistan Navy Ship Babur for Merchant Vessel Suez but also 
undertook dangerous maneuvers, which resulted in the brushing of the 
sides of the two warships . . . This incident constitutes a serious violation 
of international regulations pertaining to safe conduct at high seas and of 
the India-Pakistan Agreement of 1991 on Advance Notice of Military 
Exercise Maneuvers and Troop Movements179.”180 
b. India’s Response  
In the whole episode of MV Suez’s hijacking followed by release from the 
pirates by a Pakistani human rights activist, the slow or ignored response of India’s 
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government was highly criticized by the Indian media in general and by the families of 
crew members in particular. Moreover, tasking a war ship to escort MV Suez when the 
task was already being undertaken by PNS Babur is also not understood by the Indian 
scholar community.181  
Along these lines, Vasan stated that,  
It can be inferred that sending the Indian warship was an afterthought to 
make amends for the lack of proactive action by India. It appeared that the 
government of India decided to dispatch the naval ship to salvage its pride 
much after the event was over (after not doing much while it was most 
needed) . . .  it is evident that there have been failures of command, control 
and coordination while tasking Godavari for a mission which was already 
completed.182 
Nevertheless, in the developing diplomatic war, India also lodged the same complaint 
against Pakistan and stated that, “INS Godavari had, after failing to get any response 
from the Pakistani skipper of Suez, started leaving the area when PNS Babur came in 
from behind and carried out the aggressive maneuver. In the process, the Pakistani ship 
rubbed against INS Godavari.”183 
Apart from shadowing and buzzing each other’s ships and aircraft, the 
incident with the PN Atlantique aircraft and the encounter between Babur and Godavari 
are the only two major incidents between the Pakistan and Indian navies thus far. The 
same nature of occurrences will continue in future as well, if both sides do not initiate 
positive steps. These incidents are identical to the incidents occurred between the U.S. 
and USSR maritime forces during the Cold War.184 The dangerous Cold War’s maritime 
incidents led the U.S. and USSR to negotiate an agreement known as the Incidents at Sea 
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Agreement (INCSEA).185 This agreement can be used as a model for the naval forces of 
Pakistan and India to enhance cooperation while operating at sea.  
3. Case Study – INCSEA between the U.S. and USSR 
In the Cold War era, U.S. maritime supremacy was unchallenged, except when 
the U.S. ships and aircraft operated close to the USSR waters. The U.S. sea assets faced 
aggressive response from the then small USSR Navy. The situation further changed when 
the USSR expanded its naval capabilities in the 1960s and extended their deployments to 
the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. The expansion of naval 
capabilities encouraged the USSR maritime forces to test the aggressive tactics not only 
in the home water but in the open oceans as well. These deployments brought both 
countries’ naval forces in close encounters at numerous occasions. Both sides’ forces 
started harassing each other, and many incidents happened resulting in loss of lives and 
assets. One of the incidents happened in the Baltic Sea in 1962, when USSR warships 
crossed bows with American warships, intending to humiliate the U.S. Navy. Junnola 
mentioned that  
The U.S. also tracked Soviet aircraft harassment of American flight 
operations, recording five accidents of this type . . . one incident in the 
North Sea in the vicinity of the aircraft carrier USS Essex resulted in the 
crash of a Soviet aircraft . . . other areas of concern included the Soviets’ 
use of search lights to illuminate ships’ bridges and helicopter cockpits at 
night; the use of international signal for deceptive purposes; instances of 
ships proactively training their guns or missiles; and episodes of aircraft 
flyovers with open bomb bay door.186  
The results of these irrational and irresponsible incidents at sea187 led the U.S. 
and USSR to a realization that both countries could get nothing but loss of lives, ships, 
and aircraft. Therefore, both the countries negotiated the INCSEA agreement and finally 
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succeeded in 1972. Both the countries discussed the issues professionally and with 
utmost frankness that contributed to the success of the agreement. In addition, they also 
shouldered the responsibility for any violation related to the agreement.188 Paul Kesaris 
viewed that “The 1972 U.S.-USSR INCSEA (Incidents at Sea) Agreement has been 
successful for 18 years in ameliorating one potential area of superpower tension . . . 
Development of enhanced confidence-building measures appears to offer the best 
prospect for reducing residual U.S.-Soviet confrontations and tensions at sea.”189 
The INCSEA agreement played a vital role in reducing incidents at sea, opening 
communication channels, developing confidence, and reducing tension between the U.S. 
and USSR navies in general and governments in particular. It also played a role of 
catalyst for other navies to make agreements on the same lines, such as agreements 
between the USSR and Germany in 1988, the USSR and Norway in 1990, and recently 
signed INCSEA agreement between the U.S. and China. 
4. Recommendations for a Way Forward  
The hostile history of Pakistan and India has created a trust deficit in both the 
governments and particularly in military forces. In fact, both countries have realized that 
their rival attitude will damage the countries in many respects. In this regard, they also 
initiated variety of bilateral peace processes at different occasions, but mistrust and lack 
of political will discouraged their plans. A former Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Fasih 
Bokhari expressed his views saying,  
I would like to see India and Iran trading across our soil; Central Asia and 
India trading across our soil, because that is a part of integration into the 
region which gives our neighbors a stake in our security . . . moving away 
from fifty years of India-centric policies which have been hostile and 
confrontationist into the next fifty years of befriending India.190  
                                                 
188 Jill R. Junnola, “Maritime Confidence-Building in Regions of Tension,”17–18. 
189 Paul. Kesaris, Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control, and the Threat of Thermonuclear War: Special 
Studies Sixth Supplement, 1991–1992, (University Publications of America), 22–23.  
190  Sakhuja Vijay, in “Cold War in the Arabian Sea,” cited Defense Journal December 1997, “An 
Interview with Admiral Fasih Bokhari, CNS Pakistan Navy.” 
62 
 
Nevertheless, both the countries are required to take constructive measures to avoid 
untoward situations at sea, and develop trust and cooperation between two navies. In this 
context, the following recommendations are proposed. 
a. Recommendation 1  
The INCSEA agreement between the U.S. and USSR has been perceived 
as a confidence builder by the world’s navies. Although the agreement has not resolved 
all sea incidents between the U.S. and USSR; however, the grievous problems including 
harassment that troubled both the countries from 1960s to 1970s were effectively 
addressed. The agreement also contributed in developing military-to-military relations 
between the U.S. and USSR. The INCSEA agreement is the perfect example for Pakistan 
and India to understand each other’s problems with a professional manner, to develop 
trust and cooperation between naval forces, respect each other’s sovereignty, and of 
course avoid sea skirmishes and both intentional and unintentional incidents. Pakistan 
and India must follow the lines of the INCSEA agreement that will establish the channels 
of communication between the navies of both the countries. In this regard, both 
countries’ Ministries of Defense and Naval Headquarters should form a committee of 
professional officers to negotiate the agreement on the basis of the INCSEA agreement 
between the U.S. and USSR. Moreover the existing agreement of April 6, 1991 between 
Pakistan and India on the Advance Notice of Military Exercises may be reviewed if 
deemed appropriate using the INCSEA agreement as a guideline, and then both countries 
should respect it in the spirit of peace. 
b. Recommendation 2  
Piracy has become a regular feature in the Arabian Sea. The Pakistan 
Navy, being part of the combined task force 151 (CTF-151,) is playing a leading role and 
has a certain edge in the region to conduct anti-piracy operations professionally and in 
coordination with all coalition partners. Moreover, the induction of surface ships from 
China and the U.S., and its own ship and submarine building capabilities are bringing the 
Pakistan Navy into regional power in the near future. On the other hand, the Indian Navy 
already has the capabilities to maintain its presence and projection of power in the Indian 
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Ocean Region. Therefore, the Indian higher authorities should direct the Indian Navy to 
proactively participate in anti-piracy operations, and show a part in maintenance of law 
and order at sea. A good strategy would be that Pakistan and India should come out from 
under the hostilities’ shell, and should work out joint methodology to curb piracy and 
maritime terrorism in the region through their powerful navies. In this regard, they should 
take the initiative in formulating joint policies and standard operating procedures for 
conduct of such operations. In addition, being strong navies in the region, they should 
also work out modalities to engage the other regional smaller navies in their cause. These 
measures will cover the communication gap between both navies, develop trust and 
cooperation, and as a matter of fact, bring peace and harmony to the region.        
C. CONCLUSION 
More than sixty years of ongoing confrontation between Pakistan and India have 
heavily charged both countries in terms of economic and social development. People of 
both countries desire a tension free environment, where they should not suffer fatigue of 
crises.  
Moreover, cooperation between the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) 
and the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) are also in need of facilitating fisher-folk of both 
countries and increasing bilateral relations, as similar to the other navies of world. 
Nevertheless, shadowing, buzzing, and encountering each other’s naval platforms will 
further hinder bilateral relations. The Atlantique and the ship incidents at sea are to be 
considered chilling reminders for both the countries. In the changing world order and 
maritime environment of the present, ships and aircraft meet more often than before. 
Both countries’ governments should realize the gravity of irresponsible actions and 
activities of these sea platforms, and must negotiate joint methodologies for a better 
atmosphere in the region to avoid future serious consequences. Now the only requirement 
is that both governments should show goodwill to resolve the issue bilaterally or involve 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
65 
 
IV. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS) AND THE 
POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION BETWEEN 
PAKISTAN AND INDIA 
The peace of South Asian region requires good bilateral relations between 
Pakistan and India, and seeks settlement of their long-lasting conflicts to bring prosperity 
and overcome the problems of unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty. This process 
requires a reassessment of the relationship between Pakistan and India.191 Such a 
reassessment may well begin with confidence-building measures (CBMs) to build an 
atmosphere of trust between the two rival nations. In the present era, CBMs are 
considered a useful tool for conflict resolution. This perception mainly emerged from 
Europe in the 1970s, when CBMs succeeded in preventing a third world war, easing 
tension between East and West through the so-called Helsinki process: measures and 
mechanisms that became formalized in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). The Cold War superpowers also relied on CBMs to minimize the risk of 
an accidental nuclear war. Granted this experience, lessons learned from the successful 
experiences of one region’s CBMs, can, with a careful study of the particular 
circumstances, apply to another region.192  
Indeed, in several instances, CBMs have prompted states in conflict—even very 
bitter rivals—to reduce their latent hostility and to lessen misperceptions, mistrust, and 
the degree of their mutual fear. A. Z. Hilali argues:  
CBMs are instruments for the prevention of war and conflict and for the 
resolution of existing conflicts between regional neighbors or parties to the 
kind of long-standing confrontation in which normal channels of 
communication are weak or have broken down . . . The utility of CBMs is 
perceived to derive from their gradual creation of an atmosphere of mutual 
trust, transparency, and predictability in slow and incremental steps in 
order to provide alternatives to confrontation and conflict where 
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differences between states recur or have been inflamed or where new 
points of contention have arisen.193   
In the case of Pakistan and India, initiatives and small steps from both sides may 
help resolve bigger issues like the Kashmir conflict, Siachen Glacier, and LOC issues, 
and ultimately defuse a smoldering nuclear tinderbox of accumulating issues on either 
side of the long shared border.  
In this regard, this chapter begins with an overview the history of CBMs between 
Pakistan and India. The purpose of this overview is not to go into the details of each 
event, but to show how and why, despite numerous CBMs and initiatives, Pakistan and 
India have not yet achieved good bilateral relations and stability in the region. 
Unfortunately, the history of CBMs between Pakistan and India shows that earlier 
measures did not enjoy complete success or effectiveness due to unfortunate incidents 
that occurred during or immediately after the CBM process. This mixed record only 
underscores the need for renewed CBM efforts. 
In terms of better models, this chapter then presents two case studies that explore 
the features of successful CBMs. The first case study concerns CBMs between Israel and 
Egypt, where the absence of trust and political will between both sides’ leadership, 
particularly on the Egyptian side, resulted in unsuccessful CBMs. These tensions were 
exacerbated by the ideological differences between Israel and Egypt as well as external 
political pressure from the other Arab countries, and therefore the CBMs could not 
succeed. On the other hand, the second case study presents CBMs between China and 
India, where trustworthiness and political will on both sides, plus a new emphasis on 
regional stability and economic concerns paved the way for success. China and India 
gradually developed their CBMs through small steps, including their 1993 and 1996 
agreements and subsequently the joint working group (JWG) meetings.  
The case studies are followed by an analysis that suggests a way forward for 
Pakistan and India, encompassing CBMs and drawing on the case studies. In addition to 
person-to-person interactions, increased military and trade cooperation, and cultural 
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exchange, some promising small steps also include the resolution of such less contentious 
issues as Sir Creek, captured fishermen, and operational encounters between Pakistan and 
India. 
A. CONFIDENCE BUILDING BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA 
Confidence building is an old phenomenon that has a long but more or less 
undistinguished record in relations between Pakistan and India. Despite of the unhappy 
legacy of the 1947 partition and the ensuing decades’ four wars and unresolved issues, 
both nations have agreed at certain times on numerous civil and military bilateral 
agreements to reduce tensions and promote confidence. In addition, the public on both 
sides also shows an interest in such measures and wishes to sustain peace and 
cooperation. Tables 5, 6, and 7 list these measures. 
Table 5.   Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)—Diplomatic and Military.194  
Date Description 
1968  An agreement on all outstanding points with regard to the western sector of Rann 
of Kutch.  
December, 1971  Hotline between Pakistani and Indian Director General of Military Operations 
(DG MOs) was established. In Lahore Summit 1999, agreed to review all existing 
communication links with a view to upgrade and approve the DGMO and other 
hotlines.  
January 1989  Agreement signed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto, Including agreement of not attacking each other’s 
nuclear facilities, avoidance of double taxation & cultural cooperation.  
1991  Air Space Violation agreement signed and ratified in August 1992, stipulates that 
no combat aircraft shall fly within 10 km. of each other’s airspace.  
April 1991  Agreement for prior notification of military exercises near their borders, without 
informing their military counterparts.  
1992  Joint Declaration on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by both countries, agreed 
not to develop, produce, acquire, or use chemical weapons.  
October 3, 2005  Memorandum of Understanding for the establishment of a communication link 
between Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and Indian Coast Guards. The 
accord and memorandum were signed after the talks between Foreign Minister 
Khurshid Kasuri and his counterpart Natwar Singh in Islamabad.  
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“Confidence Building Measures in Nuclear South Asia: Limitations and Prospects,” South Asian Studies, A 
Research Journal of South Asian Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, July-December 2010, 348. 
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Table 5. (cont.) 
 
Date Description 
January 1, 2006  India and Pakistan exchanged lists of their respective nuclear installations and 
facilities.  
February 21, 2007  India and Pakistan signed agreement on “Reducing the Risk from Accidents 
Relating to Nuclear Weapons.”  
August 14, 2007  India released 72 Pakistani nationals, including 48 fishermen and 24 prisoners 
from Indian jails, and Pakistan released 135 Indian nationals, including 100 
fishermen and 35 prisoners, from its jails.  
October 19, 2007  Pakistan and India held the Fifth Round of Talks to review the nuclear and missile 
related CBMs as part of the Composite Dialogue Process. The second round of 
the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM) was held in the following week.  
October 22, 2008  A second trade route across the Line of Control is opened. The route connects the 
cities of Rawalkot and Poonch.  
December 27, 
2008  
In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks that resulted in over 180 fatalities, the 
Indian and Pakistani Directors General of Military Operations made unscheduled 
use of their hotline to discuss the troop movements along their border. One likely 
topic of discussion was Indian troop rotations to exercise the areas, near Pakistani 
border and small-scale counter-deployments by Pakistani troops.  
January 1, 2009  For the 18th consecutive year, India and Pakistan exchanged lists of their 
respective nuclear facilities. The two countries also exchanged the lists of 






Table 6.   Confidence-Building Measures—Political, Commercial, Cultural, and 
Communications.195  
Date Description 
1948  An agreement was made in Karachi on exchange of prisoners, evaluation of 
urban property and preparation of revenue records and evacuation of moveable 
property  
1950  Liaqat –Nehru signed an agreement in New Delhi on the measures to be 
adopted to deal with major problems i.e., minorities rights, cultural and trade 
relations.  
1960  Indus Water Treaty Mediated by the World Bank to resolve problems 
regarding distribution of water resources.  
1966  Tashkent Declaration stipulates that “relations between India and Pakistan 
shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the 
other.  
1972  Simla Accord followed by 1971 Indo-Pak war. Both countries to renounce the 
use of force as a means of setting outstanding disputes. Both sides agreed to 
resolve their disputes in bilateral forum.  
1982  A joint Commission set up to review bi-lateral ties.  
February, 1999  Lahore Declaration: reiterating the determination of both countries to 
implementing the Shimla Agreement in letter and spirit. Resolution of all 
disputes including Kashmir.  
January, 2004  Joint Press Statement was given in Islamabad to carry the process of 
normalization forward, the President of Pakistan and Prime Minister of India 
agreed to commence the composite dialogue in Feb. 2004. Peaceful settlement 
of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both 
sides.  
September, 2004  Joint Statement was given in New York by President Musharraf and Prime 
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh reiterated their commitment to continue the 
bilateral dialogue to restore cooperation between India and Pakistan.  
February, 2005  Start Sri Nagar–Muzaffarabad bus service from Apr. 7, 2005 and resume rail 
service between Monabao–Khokhrapar (Sindh) from Oct. 2005 and launch bus 
service between Amritsar and Lahore.  
April 2005  New Delhi Statement: 17-points stated out of which one refers to Jammu & 
Kashmir issue.  
September 28, 2005  To start Lahore – Amritsar bus service in Oct 2005  
September 16, 2005  Agreed to continue CBM process and PM Manmohan to visit Islamabad.  
  









Pakistan accepts 25 tons of food, medicine, tents, blankets, plastic sheets from 
India after the earthquake.  
January 20, 2006  Bus service from Lahore to Amritsar begins.  
February 1, 2006  Pakistan and India agree to open rail links between Munnabao in Rajasthan 
and Khokhrapar in Sind on February 18, 2006.  
February 18, 2006  India and Pakistan resume train service after 40 years.  
February 27, 2006 Fiber optic link between Armitsar and Lahore becomes operational.  
March 7, 2006  Indo-Pak night bus service from Ferozepur and Fazilka to Ludhiana-
Chandigarh resumes.  
March 8, 2006  India and Pakistan agree in principle to expand airline service between the two 
nations.  
March 22, 2006  India and Pakistan agree to jointly fight human trafficking, counterfeit 
currency trade, and illegal immigration.  
March 24, 2006  Amritsar-Nankana Sahib bus service is flagged off.  
May 3, 2006  India and Pakistan reach an agreement to revive trade in Kashmir.  
June 1, 2006  India and Pakistan agree to host festivals displaying each other’s movies.  
September 16, 2006  President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh agree to “put in place an India-
Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement 
counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations.”  
May 21, 2008  The Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan agree to a series of Kashmir-
specific CBMs, including a triple-entry permit to facilitate crossing the Line of 
Control. The two ministers also agree to provide consular access to prisoners 
in each other’s’ countries.  
September 25, 2008  Pakistani President Zardari and Indian Prime Minister Singh formally 
announced the opening of several trade routes between the two countries. The 
Wagah-Atari road link and the Khokrapar-Munnabao rail link will both be 
opened to trade, as will the cross-LOC Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-
Rawalakot roads.  
July 16, 2009  The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, meeting on the sidelines of a 
summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Egypt, issue a joint statement 





With so much CBM activity, one might expect at least some reduction of tensions 
between Pakistan and India. However, the CBM process always seems to go backward 
and forward, with success just out of reach of any and every measure. “Success” in the 
case of CMBs means that these measures have seen a clear, if incremental, relaxation of 
tensions and that the initial small steps lead to new CBMs and more normal relations 
between the States. In this sense, then, all Pakistan-India CBMs so far have failed 
because not a single issue has been resolved between both the nations. These CBMs have 
been derailed amid the uncongenial political situation on both sides—trust deficits, 
disruptive incidents, and the unresolved state of minor issues as well as the bigger 
conflicts.196  
Indeed, both Pakistan and India struggled for decades to ensure and sustain 
military and non-military CBMs to bring normalcy in the border areas in general and in 
the Kashmir area in particular, despite continuous tensions between the two nations. 
However, tragic incidents ranging from low-intensity conflicts to major wars and terrorist 
attacks on both sides repeatedly interrupted the process—and progress—of the CBMs.197 
The hotlines between political and military leaders have barely been utilized, a 
communication deficit that only deepens mutual distrust and has prompted each side to 
accuse the other of spreading incorrect information. Pakistan and India constantly 
exchange lists of nuclear facilities, but each side believes that the information received is 
wrong and cannot be trusted.198 In addition,  
The ceasefire, which was implemented in 2003, was alleged to have been 
violated once by Pakistan in 2008, and the Indian Army has gone on 
record about numerous infiltrations and violations in 2009. While many 
hundreds of thousands visit India and Pakistan from across the border, the 
visa formalities for them are far from conducive to confidence building. 
Each traveler has to register at a police station within 24 hours of his 
arrival in a city and 24 hours before departing from the same. The 
whereabouts and wherewithal of his hosts are to be laid bare to the 
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authorities and must pass muster with them. These procedures leave inter-
country travel to be far from desirable.199  
 So far, then, there have been many starts but no happy endings for CBMs between 
Pakistan and India. But how else can the two nations ever hope to overcome their mutual 
suspicions? Now is the time for the leadership on both sides to try a new approach. Other 
States’ experiences offer important lessons. In this regard, two case studies, the Egyptian-
Israeli CBMs and Sino-Indian CBMs, provide fruitful examples of a less successful and a 
more successful experience, respectively. The Egypt-Israel CBMs did not work because 
of an enduring trust deficit and the lack of political will between the states’ leadership; a 
continuous cold war prevailed even after the CBMs. On other hand, China and India 
adopted a small-steps strategy, which further enhanced their cooperation in the both 
military and non-military arena. These case studies are empirical models to demonstrate 
the factors that are necessary for successful CBMs and what factors are to be avoided 
when two nations follow a path of CBMs.  
B. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN EGYPT AND 
ISRAEL  
The hostile relations between Israel and Egypt from 1948 to the 1960s are hardly 
a secret; this period witnessed continued military tensions and a series of wars. Both sides 
conceived of each other as a major military threat, a distrust that festered in the absence 
of diplomatic relations and direct channels of communication. As the situation 
deteriorated, the United States undertook a course of “shuttle diplomacy,” interposing 
itself as the honest broker between both sides, but little progress eventuated.200 Instead, at 
the end of the 1973 war, Israeli forces cornered their Egyptian counterparts in the Sinai 
area; the fight ended with Israeli troops near Cairo as both sides’ forces were drained of 
energy. The next conflict promised to be broader, deeper, and more lethal. At this 
particular stage, however, a change in the relationship commenced with direct talks 
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between both states’ leaders.201 Under the aegis of U.S. Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, Israeli and Egyptian officials started negotiation for six weeks to prepare the 
ground for two agreements attained in 1974 and 1975.202 Subsequently, these agreements 
established confidence-building measures between both states, though domestic 
ideological pressure on each side limited the communications, and the effort could not 
progress as far as the CBMs demanded.  
It is worth mentioning that Syria had also taken part in the 1973 war, and the 
situation of the Syrian war different from the Egyptian. The Syrian leadership never 
agreed to negotiate with Israeli leadership. Instead, such matters as the exchange of 
prisoners and other issues related to the ceasefire were negotiated through more of 
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy. Despite all these efforts, the Syrians declined all proposals 
and did not join the signing ceremony in Geneva. This incident also put some pressure on 
the Egyptian leadership because its ally refused to sign the agreements.   
 In 1977, following the election of a new government in Israel, an Egyptian 
representative, Dr. Hassan Tuhami, and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan met in 
Israel to intensify the direct contacts between both countries. The meeting was kept secret 
so, whatever else it achieved, it did not work to change the public postures or attitudes in 
attaining the perception of evolving bilateral relations between both the states.203 
Certainly, this activity could not contribute toward ongoing CBMs at the social level. 
However, this limited approach of direct communication evolved into adequate 
confidence at the officials’ level to further the negotiations. Both states’ leaders, 
Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, came to the conclusion, on the basis of substantial 
talks between Dayan and Tuhama, that further negotiations would advance the common 
interests of both the states. This meeting also led Sadat to visit Jerusalem in November 
1977. Steinberg maintains that, “this visit remains the quintessential example of a 
confidence-building measure, and illustrates the importance of CBMs in the transition 
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from war to peace . . . After three decades of warfare, which exhausted both Egypt and 
Israel, Sadat recognized the need for a dramatic gesture to break the deadlock and 
transform myths and misconceptions.”204  
The announcement of Sadat’s visit to Israel was viewed with suspicion by the 
Israeli leadership, who, suffused as they were in the decades of mutual animosity with 
Egypt, feared the trip could be a cover tactic for a military attack. However, Sadat’s 
arrival in Jerusalem shattered this old perception, and the Israelis realized that Egypt was 
honest about ending the state of war and in constituting diplomatic and bilateral relations. 
Sadat was warmly welcomed, with massive media coverage and thousands of people 
lined the streets, holding Egyptian flags in their hands.  Sadat’s move eventually 
changed the tense situation between Egypt and Israel—to the extent that he and Begin 
shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978. Israel returned the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty 
and dismantled all bases and settlements there. Sadat also emphasized his intention to 
resolve remaining issues without further violence, a promise—consistently fulfilled—that 
contributed to confidence building and changed the negative perception of the Israeli 
society about the Egyptian leadership at all levels.205   
The point merits emphasizing that the CBMs between Egypt and Israel could not 
progress, let alone succeed, until they were backed by consistent political will and trust 
between both the parties, as well as some softening in their ideological differences. 
Meanwhile, as a result of the stability and normalized situation, the Israeli public moved 
towards Egyptian borders, which were opened after the CBMs. Bus and air service was 
established that facilitated Israeli commerce and tourism to Egypt. Even when terrorism 
in Egypt drove down the number of people traveling to Egypt, Israelis continued to visit 
and significantly contributed to the Egyptian economy.  
On the other hand, these CBMs did not trigger meaningful underlying changes in 
the postures of Egyptians, as the Israelis had hoped; rather “the relationship between 
Israel and Egypt has been characterized by a cold peace, and in some instances, a cold 
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war.”206 In 1981, Sadat was assassinated and the office was taken over by Hosni 
Mubarak. The Israeli leadership continued visiting Egypt, but Mubarak avoided visiting 
Israel with the exception of Rabin’s funeral ceremony in 1995. In addition, other groups 
like lawyers, journalists, and scholars criticized and even expelled from their professional 
communities those individuals who were working with Israelis on different projects. The 
Egyptian press continued to portray Israel as an enemy, and continuously maintained a 
hostile opinion. Steinberg notes:  
Israel is still portrayed as an enemy, and differences over policies with 
respect to Lebanon, in terms of negotiations with the Palestinians, and the 
Israeli nuclear policy, are also subject to hostile rhetoric . . . In the absence 
of significant direct contact between Israelis and Egyptians, the negative 
images are strengthened . . . The absence of CBMs and dialogues with 
Egyptians influenced the Israeli perception of negotiations and relations 
with other partners, including the Palestinians and Syria. The “Cold 
Peace” which prevails with respect to Egypt is seen as a dangerous 
precedent for future agreements, and as a result, Israeli leaders seek more 
direct interaction and symbols of broad acceptance than was the case in 
negotiations with Egypt.207 
It is important to highlight that trust and political will are the two elements of 
successful CBMs. The ideological differences can also be managed when the political 
will exists. All measures may be counterproductive if the political will is lacking. “CBMs 
are only as strong as the fundamental political will for compromise . . . Without pre-
existing détente, CBMs appear to be of little value. They cannot create détente and under 
certain circumstances, they can be détente consuming.”208
 
In this model of CBMs there 
was absence of political will and mistrust from the Egyptian side that led to the ultimate 
failure of the CBMs.  
                                                 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid., 273. 
208 Marie-France Desjardins, Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures: Obstacles to agreement and 
the risks of overselling the process, Adelphi Paper 307, International Institute for Strategic Studies 




C. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA 
One of the world’s largest disputed and un-demarcated borders is shared by China 
and India (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7.  Sindo-Indian Border Line showing Line of Control and Disputed 
Boundries.209  
On October 9, 1962, India entered into armed conflict with the Republic of China 
to defend its conception of territorial integrity against China’s assets in Ladakh, south of 
the McMahon line.210 In response, China launched a counter-attack on October 20, 1962, 
defeating the Indian Army and following up with another attack on November 16, 1962, 
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that left the Indian forces with complete defeat.211 On that same day, China declared a 
ceasefire and pulled out to 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control (LAC). In this 
limited war, India suffered 3,120 deaths, 3,100 captures, and 1,000 wounded casualties in 
comparison with China’s 1,400 causalities.212  
The border issue was the main cause of the confrontation that led both the 
countries to war. Since then, China and India clashed several times in the 1970s and 
1980s; the Sundorong Chu standoff in 1986–1987 was the most serious of them. 
However, in the late 1970s, both countries, both of them by now nuclear powers, 
undertook to resolve the issue through confidence-building measures and border 
negotiation, as well as by reducing military forces and limiting military activities along 
the line of actual control (LAC).213 To this end, China and India sought to improve 
bilateral relations and signed two agreements in 1993214 and 1996215 as confidence-
building measures. The sections below take up both approaches in turn. 
1. Development of Bilateral Relations 
The 1962 war had badly deteriorated the bilateral relations of China and India. In 
order to reduce tension and explore ways to resolve the territorial disputes, the Indian 
Foreign Minister visited China in February 1979. The Sino-Indian initiatives achieved 
three important aims: (1) a process of meetings between heads of the governments; (2) a 
process of exchanging visits between high-level ministerial and military officials; and (3) 
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a process of establishing CMBs from 1979 to 1999.216 Sidhu divided the CBM process 
into three regimes: 
[T]he first consisted of the Sino-Indian border talks. Eight rounds were 
held between 1981 and 1987. The second regime is the joint working 
group (JWG) and its attached diplomatic and military experts group. 
Between 1989 and 1999, eleven JWG meetings have been held. Finally, 
the concrete result of this process was embodied in the agreements: the 
agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas along 
the Line of Actual Control in September 1993, and the agreement on 
confidence-building measures in the military field along the Line of 
Actual Control in the India-China border in November 1996. Thus, while 
the first two processes paved the way for improved relations, it was the 
third process that not only institutionalized the relationship but also proved 
that the process of normalization was bearing results.217  
The Sino-Indian confidence-building process afforded significant outcomes; both 
countries interacted with each other to facilitate dialogue on global, regional, and bilateral 
issues. In addition they cooperated in education, culture exchange, and trade and steadily 
progressed to military CBMs.218  
To be sure, several incidents occurred during this time that interrupted the process 
of normalization and affected future relations. Sidhu counts four major incidents: 
 [T]he first was India’s upgrading of the North East Frontier Agency 
(NEFA) to the state of Arunachal Pradesh in December 1986. This 
incurred strong protest from Beijing, which charged that India ‘seriously 
violated’ China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The second was the 
1986–87 border standoffs in Sundorong Chu in the eastern sector, where 
both sides deployed large number of troops, which almost escalated into 
open conflict. The third was China’s own missile program and its 
suspected supply of nuclear weapon and missile-related technology to 
Pakistan as well as other countries in the region was also a bone of 
contention between New Delhi and Beijing. Finally, India’s nuclear tests 
in May 1998 caused another major setback in bilateral relations.219  
                                                 
216 Ibid., 13. 
217 Ibid., 14. 
218 Ye. Zhengjia, “Sino-Indian Friendship and Cooperation Contribute to Peace and Development in 
Asia and the World At Large,” 11, 1–120; Kanti. Bajpai and Bonnie L. Coe, “Confidence Building between 
India and China,” 199–226; Rosemary. Foot, “Chinese-Indian relations and the process of building 
confidence: Implications for the Asia-Pacific,” 58–76; and Sony. Devabhaktuni, Matthew C.J. Rudolph, 
and Amit. Sevak, “Key Developments in the Sino-Indian CBM Process,” 201–204. 
219 Sidhu, “Cooperative Monitoring for Confidence Building,” 15. 
79 
 
In response to India’s nuclear tests, China cancelled the JWG meeting that was to 
be held in November 1998. Beyond all these skirmishes, however, both countries realized 
that normalcy in relations is highly important for peace and prosperity in the South Asian 
region. Therefore, they gave an encouraging turn to their relations towards normalcy in 
January 1999. In this regard, they exchanged visits and communications, agreed to 
discuss demarcation of the line of actual control, held bilateral conferences at the level of 
Directors General, and conducted the eleventh JWG meeting in Beijing on April 26–27, 
1999.220  
2. Joint Working Group Meetings—1993 and 1996 Agreements 
The JWG meetings, a product of the 1993 and 1996 agreements, have had a 
seminal role in initiating, developing, and subsequently implementing confidence-
building measures in the Sino-Indian military arena. Despite several ups and downs, the 
will of both sides’ leaders favored building confidence in important fields. Both sides 
agreed to establish military and diplomatic expert groups within the JWG; the initiated 
regular flag meetings of local commanders twice a year—in June and October—proposed 
a direct telephone line to facilitate communication between local commanders, and 
agreed that both sides’ concerns and conflicts can be clarified and even resolved through 
the JWG process.221  
In addition, they also adopted measures to ensure transparency in military forces’ 
activities along the line of actual control, to include prior notification of military 
exercises, draw-back of military troops from posts in the Sundorong Valley, and 
prevention of air intrusion.222 Moreover, to enhance the peace and serenity along the line 
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of control, the JWG meetings served as a catalyst for frank discussions and as the contact 
point for developing further CBMs (See Table 7).223  
 
Table 7.   Joint Working Group (JWG) Meetings from 1989 to 1999.224  
Time Frame Development 
First JWG meeting 
July 1–4, 1989, 
Beijing 
The two sides agreed that military experts would work out 
measures to ensure “peace and tranquility” along the LAC. 
Second JWG meeting 
August–September 
1990, New Delhi 
The two sides agreed that regular meetings in the border areas 
between the military personnel should be established to expand 
contacts, especially the respective sides’ border guards. 
Third JWG meeting 
May 13, 1991, 
Beijing 
No substantive progress, but the two sides further enhanced 
their understanding of each other’s positions and agreed to 
continue the process. 




Flag meetings between military personnel formally established, 
twice a year (June and October) at the Bum La Pass in the 
eastern sector and the Spanggur Gap in the western sector. In 
addition, it was also proposed that direct telephone links 
between local commanders should be set up, as well as 
exchanges of views on CBMs, including prior notification of 
military exercises 
Fifth JWG meeting 
October 27–29, 1992, 
Beijing 
The two sides frankly exchanged views on the border issue and 
stated each other’s positions. 
Sixth JWG meeting 
June 25–30, 1993, 
New Delhi 
Decided on a set of additional measures that would ensure 
greater transparency in the location of forward posts and 
military activities along the LAC, including prevention of air 
intrusion and redeployment of forces. 
Seventh JWG 
meeting 
July 1994, Beijing 
Failed to resolve the persistent differences between the two 
sides over ways to reduce close encounters in some areas along 
the LAC. 
Eighth JWG meeting 
August 1995, New 
Delhi 
Agreed to pull back troops from four forward posts some 50–
100 yards from each other. 
 
Ninth JWG meeting 
October 1996, 
Beijing 
Two sides agreed to increase reciprocal visits by military 
personnel with the rank of major general; to establish two 
additional meeting places along the eastern section of the Sino-
Indian border for military personnel manning the disputed line 
of control. 
                                                 
223 Shri. Prakash, “The Sixth Meeting of the Indo-China Joint Working Group,” 92–93; and 
Mansingh, “India-China Relations,” 291–292. 
224 From Sidhu, “Cooperative Monitoring for Confidence Building,” Appendix F, 46, 1999. 
81 
 
Time Frame Development 
Tenth JWG meeting 
August 4–5, 1997, 
New Delhi 
Clarification of LAC discussed and the two sides focused on 
implementing the 1993 and 1996 CBM agreements. Also 
pledged to continue dialogue on a mutually acceptable border. 
Eleventh JWG 
meeting April 26–27, 
1999, Beijing 
The meeting was originally scheduled for November 1998. 
Because of the Indian nuclear testing and the deterioration of 
bilateral relations, China cancelled the meeting. The meeting 
was reconvened and both sides pledged to restore bilateral 
relations and move the confidence-building process forward. 
 
The Sino-Indian CBM agreements of 1993 and 1996 rightly can be called 
crowning achievements because these have normalized the long process of bilateral 
relations. Sidhu has divided the main features of these agreements into three categories:  
(1) Declarative Principles include neither side shall use or threaten to use 
force against the other, both sides shall strictly respect and observe the 
LAC, both sides shall seek a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable 
settlement of the boundary question, and each side will keep its military 
forces in the border areas along the LAC to a minimum level;  
(2) Information-Exchange Measures include setting up of the diplomatic-
military experts group to hold regular meetings on implementation, 
establishing hot lines and increasing meetings between border troop 
commanders and other authorities at designated points, and exchanging 
information on natural disasters and diseases along the border; and  
(3) Constraining Measures include limiting the size of military forces 
within agreed zones along the LAC, including setting ceilings on the 
number of main battle tanks and infantry combat vehicles with main guns 
of 75 mm or larger, mortars with a caliber of at least 120 mm, surface-to-
air missiles and surface-to surface missiles each side can have (the limits 
remain to be negotiated), avoiding large-scale military exercises involving 
more than one division (15,000 troops) and providing prior notification to 
the other side on exercises involving more than one brigade (5,000 
troops), prohibiting combat aircraft flights within 10 km of the LAC 
without prior notification; however, unarmed transport aircraft and 
helicopters are permitted to fly up to the LAC, prohibiting firing, blasting, 
and hunting within 2 km of the LAC, and self-restraint in situations of 
face-to-face confrontation.225 
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Over the last two decades, China and India both have made great strides along the 
path of confidence building, and the 1993 and 1996 CBM agreements provided means of 
trust and confidence. Though both countries still have unresolved boundary disputes, 
since the CBMs have evolved, there has been no major incident along the LAC, and the 
border area has remained peaceful for the last 19 years. In addition, the JWG is also 
continuously following the boundary question.  
The Sino-Indian model differs from Egypt-Israel model in the sense that China 
and India furthered their relations and strengthened their bilateral ties. Besides observing 
peace at LAC, exchanging information on diseases and natural disasters, setting up of the 
diplomatic-military experts group, and limiting the size of military forces along the LAC, 
several other factors speak to the success of CBMs between China and India.226 For 
example, in 1958, INS Mysur entered the Shanghai port, the last port-of-call protocol 
between both the countries amid their deteriorating relations. Once their CBM regimen 
commenced, however, Chinese Navy Ship Zheng He entered Bombay harbor and re-
established the port-of-call protocol after a long period of 35 years.227 China and India 
did not stop here but signed other agreements: In January 1992, they signed an agreement 
to exchange scholars in the social sciences from the Indian Council and the Chinese 
Academy; and in September 1993, they signed an agreement to expand mutual awareness 
through television and radio. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—for example, 
women’s organizations and trade unions—increased their contacts. In 1992, India staged 
a festival for China in India, and similarly, in 1994, China staged a festival for India in 
China.228 The Chinese Communist Party directly linked with India’s communist party 
(Marxist). Today, various cities on both sides are linked through telecom lines, and direct 
flights are regularly operating between China and India. At the same time, both countries 
have devised a mechanism to provide advanced notice to each other on any military 
movement along the LAC, and to handle likely intrusions from each side.229 In August 
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1995, during the eighth JWG meeting, they not only pulled back their troops from the 
four posts near Wangdong, where they had been deployed in close proximity to each 
other, but they also built ties between both sides’ air forces and navies.230 In 1995, 
Chinese army and air force officers visited Indian air force bases. Similarly, the two 
navies cooperated to lessen concerns about the presence of the Chinese navy in Myanmar 
and Indian maritime capabilities and the naval base at Port Blair.  
The real wages of successful CBMs can be measured in terms of trade and 
commerce between the two former rivals. As far as the trading partnership of both states 
is concerned, Singh argues: 
In 1994, India became China’s largest trading partner in South Asia 
overtaking China’s long-standing close friend and ally Pakistan, and this 
should obtain India greater leverage and psychological advantage in 
dealing with Sino-Pak ties . . . On July 18, 1994, Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen signed another trade agreement on avoidance of double taxation to 
encourage business, scientific, cultural as well as personnel exchanges in 
the future.231 
All these measures overshadow the Sino-Indian border question—in stark contrast 
to the Pakistan and India border situation, where ceaseless shooting incidents and 
continuous infiltration and exfiltration from both sides is a common practice. The peace 
on the Sino-Indian border since the inception of the CBMs bodes hope in the Indian 
community that sooner or later these measures will resolve the border question as well.232 
More broadly, the Sino-Indian model of CBMs suggests that cooperation between two 
rivals is possible and can be undertaken even if two rival states are nuclear powered. 
China and India started from relatively easy information-exchange CBMs and gradually 
proceeded toward more stringent verification. Although, in the Sino-Indian case, the 
political challenge was not easy in the aftermath of Indian nuclear testing and other 
disputes between the two countries, but even then, both sides’ leaders sought cooperation 
and restored bilateral relations utilizing political will and remaining firmly focused on 
geographical realities and regional interests.   






D. A WAY FORWARD ENCOMPASSING CBMS AND THE CASE STUDIES 
Confidence-building measures usually focus on communication links, increased 
trade, military cooperation, person-to-person interactions, and cultural exchange, but in 
the case of Pakistan and India, these measures could not create the required conducive 
environment for the resolution of the complex issues that divide the two states (and also 
thwart their CBMs). Instead, political leaders on both sides often use CBMs as political 
tools to gain the maximum number of voters and for conflict avoidance rather than 
conflict resolution.233 Ghosh argues that “the impact of the CBMs still hinges on political 
will for their implementation. If the political will is present, the measures can be seen 
through to their fruition . . . There is no viable alternative to a gradual and incremental 
peace process through military and non-military CBMs. The derailment in the peace 
process occurs when there is an attempt to find instant solutions to old and complex 
problems.”234 In other words, resolution of the bigger and complex issues cannot be 
undertaken until a more conducive environment prevails, and this transformation can be 
made possible through a gradual procedure of resolving minor issues with trust and 
political will. Instead of fixating on the macro-issues, both nations must turn their 
attention to micro-issues.235  
China and India’s model of CBMs is a regional precedent for border cooperation. 
Much as various acute incidents impinged on—but did not ruin—the Sino-Indian CBMs, 
Pakistan and India also had major wars, other low-intensity conflicts, and concerns about 
each other’s nuclear programs in parallel with the CBMs’ process. China and India, 
however, placed more importance on conflict resolution than conflict avoidance. Both 
nations followed a gradual but steady and process of CBMs by signing the 1993 and 1996 
agreements, followed by JWG meetings and the exchange of visits.  
In contrast, when India and Pakistan meet, the behavior of both nations abruptly 
changes. On one side, India shows its anger and frustration over terrorist attacks, while 
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on the other side, Pakistan wants faster results and more emphasis on the Kashmir issue, 
which in turn undermines the CBM process. Tahir-Kheli also suggests that:  
. . . while many of the provisions of the two border agreements between 
India and China (including notifications, exercise limits, and aircraft 
restrictions) are similar to measures already in place in India-Pakistan 
agreements, others offer additional prospects for building confidence. 
Chief among them may be exchanging maps, conducting flag-officer-level 
meetings at designated border locations, assisting in the sharing of 
information on diseases, and providing disaster assistance. Similar CBMs 
could be employed along other sections of the boundary.236      
Pakistan and India should move from the currently low-confidence level to a 
higher-confidence level, because now, relations (and CBMs) are characterized by 
insufficient political will, mutual distrust of governments and people, and entrenched 
miscommunications. Such high- or at least higher-level confidence may not require the 
wholesale replacement of the previous CBMs; instead, Pakistan and India should 
augment the existing CBMs through the resolution of the less contentious issues that exist 
in the maritime domain. The resolution of Sir Creek, the fishermen issues, and the 
operational encounters will contribute to moving Pakistan and India beyond the prevalent 
dilemma of distrust, lack of political will, and other impediments that hinder the progress 
of bilateral relations, and will surely lead them to resolve their complex issues including 
Kashmir, the LOC, and the Siachen Glacier at a later stage. 
E. CONCLUSION  
Over the last six decades, ranging from 1947 to 2009, Pakistan and India both 
have seen a series of CBMs in terms of dialogue and contacts, but no major achievement 
has been witnessed so far resolving a single dispute. Both nations float a fragile plank of 
CBMs that is always susceptible to damage as a result of any minor or major incident. 
History shows that despite interest from the general public on both sides, the 
governments could not succeed in getting fruitful outcomes from the past CBMs. 
Unfortunately, such CBMs that would diminish the trust deficit, miscalculations, and 
miscommunications—and ultimately reduce hostility—have not been utilized by both 
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sides because of the persistence of mistrust, the lack of political will, and the failure to 
learn lessons from other countries across the globe. Noting the serious consequences of 
harsh relations of Pakistan and India, Hilali notes: 
The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive, 
creative, and courageous and to address simultaneously the immediate as 
well as the root causes of conflict . . . All concrete steps will be useless 
and ineffective if India and Pakistan are not serious about settling the 
existing problems. There is a possibility of an automatic escalation from 
border clashes to local warfare leading to nuclear war.237 
It is evident from the case study of Egypt-Israel that the absence of trust and 
political will influence, perhaps catastrophically, the overall effects of CBMs. In contrast, 
in the case of China-India, these influential factors led to successful CBMs. Despite 
numerous other issues that cropped up during the process of CBMs, both China and India 
followed the step-by-step procedure to resolve their ongoing and outstanding issues. In 
fact both sides’ leadership realized that further conflicts will harm their overall interests 
in the region. Although Pakistan-India’s case has numerous similarities with the China-
India model, the parties do not follow the same path. On one hand, Indian decision-
makers presume the status of regional power, and after the Mumbai attacks, they expect 
Pakistan to behave in a same way it did vis-à-vis the United States after 9/11. On other 
hand, Pakistan does not accept India’s position. The Indian hawks do not want to talk 
about the Kashmir issue, while the Pakistani falcons insist on a “Kashmir First” stance. 
Despite the lack of trust, political will, and encouraging movement on conflict 
resolutions so far, the CBM history of Pakistan and India does offer a glowing hope that 
sooner or later, both the nations will come to their senses. Although the outcomes of past 
CBMs are not especially fruitful, both nations at least concur that the process of peace is 
vital. In this regard, the step-by-step strategy—the resolution of simpler and less 
contentious conflicts—will prepare and soften the way ahead, leading both nations to 
dismantle the obstacles to the final settlement of the complex issues.    
  
                                                 




In the aftermath of World War II, Britain could no longer sustain its presence in 
South Asia and withdrew from the sub-continent hastily and with little planning for what 
should come next. This precipitous withdrawal, exacerbated by the partition of sub-
continent in August 1947, left newborn Pakistan and India with traumatic issues, 
including the resettlement of five million exiled persons on either side of the borders and 
unresolved border disputes in the Kashmir, Siachen Glacier, and Sir Creek regions, which 
subsequently caused major interstate conflicts and severely stressed bilateral relations 
between Pakistan and India. These unresolved issues caught fire in the form of three 
major wars: the first Kashmir war in 1948, the second Kashmir war in 1965, and the 1971 
war. In their turn, these wars increased militarization on both sides, colored political and 
public perceptions, and escalated both nations to the very brink of a nuclear contest.  
The history of conflict and the addition of nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical) 
have made South Asia one of the most explosive regions of the world. Tahir-Kheli wrote:  
Since their respective nuclear tests of 1998, the volatile relationship 
between India and Pakistan is often referred to as the most dangerous 
potential flash point in today’s international system. The nuclear tests 
finally demonstrated the highest costs of any future conflict between two 
neighbors whose past already reflects three major and two less widespread 
wars. Any future conflict is more than likely to stem from the differences 
over Kashmir, an area claimed by both sides. Furthermore, the likelihood 
of war increases if one adds the misunderstandings, the missed signals, 
and the involvement of non-state elements to the scenario of 
confrontation. In other words, there is no dearth of reasons why India and 
Pakistan may go to war.238 
Since Independence, both sides’ military forces have squared off, eyeball to 
eyeball, on the borders, particularly on the land borders. Unfortunately, both sides are 
more concerned about the land issues, which are more complex and contentious in nature, 
and have ignored the maritime issues—including Sir Creek, fishermen, and operational 
encounters—beyond the comparatively low-level tit-for-tat that this thesis has 
documented. The preoccupation with land-based issues is a fixture of political and 
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strategic thought on either side of the border. Pakistan’s military, led by the ground forces 
remains dominant in the domestic political structure, and it focuses more on Kashmir, 
Siachen Glacier, and LOC issues. India is also fundamentally land-oriented, despite 
having a vast and massive coastline that richly contributes in its economy. Indeed, around 
95 percent of both states’ economies rely on sea routes, which make the inattention to the 
maritime disputes all the more striking.239 This statistic also underscores the promise that 
attaches to the resolution of these issues or at least the improvement of Pakistan-Indian 
relations in this realm. These maritime issues are very straightforward in nature and do 
not carry the long-standing emotional and political charge of the major land issues; thus, 
they lend themselves to resolution. It helps, too, that both sides’ naval forces have a less 
conflicted history. Still, any progress on any contentious issues would be a marked 
improvement—and can play the role of catalyst in turn to resolve the bigger issues.           
Consider Sir Creek. Although the issue has a long and contentious history and 
numerous talks and meetings so far have failed to resolve the contentions, the issue itself 
is not difficult to settle. It has become complex because of the trust deficit between the 
governments and the insistence on linking the issue with the resolution of other hard-
core, land-based issues. If both Pakistan and India disconnect these issues and reverse the 
order of the tasks, Sir Creek can be resolved—with far-reaching consequences. The Sir 
Creek issue is similar to other international maritime issues like Guyana and Suriname, 
and Benin and Niger. These countries have successfully resolved the same kinds of 
disputes through existing rules and principles of customary law. The Guyana and 
Suriname case was resolved under the thalweg principle, while the Benin and Niger 
decision was taken on the ICJ’s judgment. The Sir Creek dispute can be resolved in light 
of the Guyana and Suriname case study if Pakistan agrees with the India’s claim to 
resolve the issue under the thalweg principle. The other option is to resolve the issue 
through the ICJ, along the lines of the Benin and Niger case study, utilizing the records 
and history of the Sir Creek case. Pakistan and India have records like old maps, charts, 
and letters—the kind of documentation that was made available to the ICJ in the case of 
Benin and Niger. In addition, both Pakistan and India have conducted a hydrographic 
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survey of the Sir Creek area and charts have also been exchanged by both sides. In short, 
the available elements for a happy resolution of the Sir Creek dispute can and should be 
used.  
Because the Sir Creek issue has not been resolved, the resolution of maritime 
boundaries remains unsettled. Thus, the poor fishermen of both sides intentionally or 
unintentionally trespass these un-demarcated boundaries in search of fish. The security 
forces arrest these fishermen as a consequence, confiscate their boats, and put them in jail 
for an unlimited time.240 These unfortunate fishermen not only lose their means of 
livelihood but also their freedom for years without any contact with their families. Khan 
noted: 
[T]he fishermen are trapped in the situation created by the non-resolution 
of the Sir Creek dispute, and the two states actually seem to be using their 
fishermen to put pressure on each other to sign on the dotted line. In fact, 
when the fishermen are released periodically, they provide photo 
opportunities to state propaganda machines on both sides to defame each 
other.”241    
This vicious cycle also can be resolved separately, in light of the case study of the 
resolution of the fishermen issue between China and Korea. China and Korea allocate 
different zones for each country’s fishermen as well as a combined zone, a model that 
provides a complete recipe for Pakistan and India. In addition, cooperation between the 
Pakistan Maritime Security Agency (PMSA) and the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) is also 
considered prudent to facilitate the fisher-folk of both sides, which measures will in turn 
create a positive perception among the people of Pakistan and India and also will develop 
a sense of good bilateral relations. 
The maritime tension between Pakistan and India is further aggravated by both 
sides’ naval forces’ actions and encounters. Although the shooting down of Pakistan 
Navy Atlantique aircraft by the Indian Air Force and the brushing of PNS Babur by INS 
Godavari are the only two major incidents to date, both sides’ naval forces often engage 
in shadowing, buzzing, and encountering each other platforms, which affect bilateral 
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relations as a consequence. For the purposes of this analysis, it really does not matter who 
is at fault in which incident; the main point is that these sorts of incidents can easily be 
avoided by both sides. Numerous examples are available in the world where the nations 
took responsible actions to avoid such incidents and casualties. In this regard, the 
INCSEA agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union provide a way 
forward for other nations in general and for Pakistan and India in particular. If the two 
nuclear and super-powers of the world can work out a method by which to avoid such 
incidents at sea, then such accommodation must also be possible between the other 
nations. Moreover, such an agreement between Pakistan and India will not only avoid 
further incidents, but also will develop confidence between the two forces operating at 
sea and undoubtedly improve bilateral relations.  
The purpose of seeking resolution of the disputes in the maritime domain is to 
find an alternative way to build confidence for good bilateral relations between Pakistan 
and India. As this thesis has shown, a series of confidence-building measures have been 
undertaken from 1947 to 2009, but none of them has reached a stage where it could 
resolve a single conflict. In other words, no net gains in confidence have been posted. 
Where the purpose of CBMs is to lessen miscalculation and miscommunication, and 
resolve the conflicts, Pakistan and India use CBMs only for conflict avoidance.  
The history of CBMs between both the states is not encouraging. For example, in 
1965, a hotline was established between the director generals of military operations 
(DGMO) of Pakistan and India as a CBM to prevent another acute situation from 
developing, but the facility has been highly underused, particularly during Kargil 
crisis.242 Similarly, after the 1971 war, both sides’ prime ministers met in July 1972 to 
recapitulate the situation and turn it to improved relations. They agreed on concluding the 
conflict and adjusting some territory, but instead, the status quo reasserted itself on the 
international border and both sides’ armies remain on the LOC.243 More generally, any 
number of agreements exist on “advanced notification on military exercise, maneuvers, 
and troops movements,” and “prevention of airspace violations,” but both countries have 
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continuously violated the agreements. Another agreement about the exchange of lists of 
nuclear facilities has never been trusted by both sides.244 The persistence of mistrust and 
the lack of political will have kept both the countries from developing good relations, just 
as happened in the case of the CBMs between Egypt and Israel. On the other hand, the 
model of CBMs between China and India provides hope that two countries–nuclear states 
with a record of hot wars on their border—have achieved successful CBMs. Pakistan and 
India also can succeed by following the path of trust and using CBMs as means of 
conflict resolution, not as conflict avoidance.  
The confidence-building measures should take a step-by-step approach based on 
resolving minor and less contentious issues such as Sir Creek, the fishermen, and 
operational encounter issues. The resolution of these issues will build up trust in the 
military and non-military arenas and will create positive perceptions among the people 
about both sides’ governments. Pakistan and India both should realize that settlement of 
bilateral disputes including Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the LOC is in their interest. 
Keeping in view the hard stance of both sides on the Kashmir issue, initially the Kashmir 
issue, including Siachen Glacier and the LOC issues, can be set aside and both 
governments should give more attention and consideration to the issues that are less 
politically volatile, notably the maritime issues.  
Both sides should understand that war is no option for the settlement of disputes, 
especially when both countries are equipped with nuclear weapons. The enduring 
disputes between Pakistan and India have already deeply affected both countries in terms 
of economic and social development. It is prudent to highlight that the resolution of all 
maritime disputes will assist Pakistan and India to delimitate their maritime boundaries in 
the Arabian Sea, solve the fishermen’s problems, and increase cooperation between both 
sides’ naval forces, while it will also further the expectations of progress on the other 
more complex land-based issues such as Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier, and the LOC. 
From the perspective of Pakistan and India, the resolution of maritime issues is a logical 
and important way forward toward resolving lasting peace.      
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